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OBERGEFELL’S AMBIGUOUS IMPACT ON LEGAL 
PARENTAGE
LESLIE JOAN HARRIS*
DOMA's principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned mar-
riages and make them unequal. … The differentiation demeans the cou-
ple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects and whose 
relationship the State has sought to dignify. And it humiliates tens of 
thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in 
question makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the 
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other 
families in their community and in their daily lives.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central 
premise of the right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and pre-
dictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing 
their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant mate-
rial costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no 
fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The mar-
riage laws at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-
sex couples.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600-01 (2015).
The lawyers who structured the campaign for marriage equality for 
same-sex couples emphasized that denying these adults access to marriage 
harmed their children whom they were actually raising. They crafted this 
argument at least partially in response to their opponents’ claim that oppo-
site-sex married families are uniquely well-suited to raising children and 
that the ban on same-sex marriage was constitutional because it promoted 
childbearing within opposite-sex marriages.1 While a few state courts ac-
cepted the opponents’ claim,2 more accepted the counterargument that the 
* Dorothy Kliks Fones Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. Thanks to Prof. Jeffrey Parness 
for arranging this symposium and to the editors for their hard work.
1. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 
1236–40 (2016).
2. Standhardt v. Superior Ct. ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 462–64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
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children of same-sex couples were harmed when their parents were denied 
access to marriage.3 Of course, the Supreme Court also accepted the latter 
argument in Windsor and Obergefell and said that it supported the conclu-
sion that bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize same-sex 
marriages from other jurisdictions violate the Fourteenth Amendment.4 As 
a few scholars have written, these cases also have the potential to affect the 
law of parent-child relations more broadly, particularly the law that deter-
mines who is a legal parent.5 However, how the cases will affect this area 
of the law is at best ambiguous.
For more than thirty years, the central question of the law of parentage 
has been when and to what extent determinations of legal parenthood 
should be based on biological relationship, marriage to a child’s biological 
parent, or functioning as or intending to be a parent.6 This question is em-
bedded in the excerpts from the Supreme Court decisions at the beginning 
of this article. On the one hand, the Court is endorsing the claim that chil-
dren whose parents are married are better off socially and legally than non-
marital children; the language in both opinions could easily be taken to 
support legal rules that encourage or prefer childrearing within marriage.7
On the other hand, the Court’s argument assumes that both members of the 
571, 635 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 1 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 
138 P.3d 963, 982–84 (Wash. 2006). 
3. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 956–57 (Mass. 2003); 
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 474–75 (Conn. 2008); In re Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217–18 (N.J. 2006).
4. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2600–01 (2015).
5. See NeJaime, supra note 1, at 1190; Joanna L. Grossman, Parentage without Gender, 17 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 717, 718 (2016).
6. Many scholars have made the arguments for recognizing and protecting children’s relation-
ships to adults who take on parental responsibilities toward them. One of the earliest and most influen-
tial articles is Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal 
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984). I discuss 
the basic issues in Leslie J. Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L.
REV. 461 (1996). 
7. Even while celebrating the successes of the marriage equality movement in state courts before 
Windsor and Obergefell, some legal scholars expressed concern about the risk that legal parenthood 
would become even more strongly tied to a marriage as an unintended consequence. Nancy D. Polikoff, 
The New “Illegitimacy”: Winning Backward in the Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721, 722 (2012); Courtney G. Joslin, Leaving No (Nonmarital) 
Child Behind, 48 FAM. L. Q. 495, 496 (2014). 
A number of scholars have criticized Obergefell’s valorization of marriage to the possible detriment of 
other family arrangements generally. Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial 
Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 23 (2015); Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of 
the Nonmarital Family, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (2015); Catherine Powell, Up from Marriage: 
Freedom, Solitude, and Individual Autonomy in the Shadow of Marriage Equality, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 69, 71–73 (2015); see also Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L.
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same-sex couple are in fact parents of the children, even though it is highly 
likely that only one adult is biologically related to the child.8 The unspoken 
premise of the argument is that both are parents because both function as 
parents (and often, but not always, both participated in the decision-making 
process that led to the child’s conception and birth).
At the root of the debate over legal parenthood is, for children, the rel-
ative importance of blood ties and legal relationships between adults com-
pared to the children’s own relationships with adults who function as their
parents and develop emotional bonds with them. Proponents of the view 
that the child’s relationships matter more argue that a child’s greatest need 
is for a close, stable relationship with an adult committed to the child’s
welfare, and that the law of parenthood should protect such a relationship.9
Few, if any, seriously question the importance of protecting these relation-
ships between children and their adult caregivers; the debate is over the 
best way to protect all children generally and to advance other social goals.
The traditional law of parentage protected functional parenthood, 
though not expressly. It provided that marriage to a child’s mother was the 
only way that anyone except the mother became a legal parent (other than 
by adoption) through a centuries-old rule that is still viable today: a married 
woman’s husband is presumed to be the father of her children.10 When
most children were born to married women, this rule served to identify as 
the legal father the man who was most likely to be a child’s biological and 
social father.11 However, as non-marital childbearing increased dramatical-
ly, relying primarily on marriage to determine legal paternity became un-
sustainable. The law of parentage for non-marital children has developed 
two strands. One emphasizes the needs of the child support enforcement 
system and bases legal parentage on biological paternity. The other is used 
mostly to determine custody and related issues and focuses on the psycho-
logical and functional relationships between the child and the adults. How-
ever, the biology-based strand of the law is often taken as the norm, while 
8. The exception would be where one woman provides the egg that is fertilized and then carried 
to term by another woman. Even then, some people debate whether gestation counts as biological 
motherhood. See generally Annette R. Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection: Heteronorma-
tivity, Same-Sex Parenting and the Lessons of Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 289 (2008); Melanie B. 
Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 433 (2005); Naomi Cahn, Children’s Interests and Information Disclosure: Who Provided the 
Egg and Sperm? Or Mommy, Where (and Whom) Do I Come From, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2000). 
9. The classic article expressing this view is Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an 
Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed,
70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984).
10. See Part III infra.





      03/01/2017   10:44:39
38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 36 Side B      03/01/2017   10:44:39
58 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:1
the claims to protect functional relationships are treated as exceptions.12
The dominance of biologically based paternity also affects marital children, 
particularly when a husband’s legal paternity is challenged on the basis that 
he is not the biological father.13 Faced with the tacit expectation that legal 
parenthood depends on biological parenthood, proponents of functional 
parenthood must constantly struggle for the acceptance of their position.
This article examines how the law in the various states balances 
claims to base legal parentage on biology, function, and marriage, and how 
the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage decisions are affecting that bal-
ance. It concludes that the decisions are having some impact in the lower 
courts, particularly by supporting recognition of the parental claims of 
adults who are not biologically related to children whom they have raised 
with their same-sex partners. However, these decisions are limited and 
cannot protect children and their functional parents adequately in all situa-
tions. Therefore, legislative solutions are still needed.
The first part of this article describes changing social conditions that 
have generated today’s uncertainty about the law of legal parenthood. The 
second part analyzes statutes and case law that directly recognize function-
al parenthood through such doctrines as de facto parentage, with a focus on 
recent decisions with mixed results from Oklahoma,14 Maryland,15 Massa-
chusetts,16 New York,17 and Wyoming.18 The third and fourth parts exam-
ine more traditional rules of parentage, first when children are born to 
married women, and then when the mothers are not married. Each part 
includes a discussion of cases extending these principles to children of 
same-sex couples. The final part returns to the questions of the adequacy of 
current law and the need for legislation to improve the situation.
I. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THE LAW OF PARENTAGE
In 2015 in the United States, about fifty-one million children younger 
than eighteen, or 69%, lived with both parents.19 The parents of most of 
12. Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody and Child 
Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 632 (2009) [hereinafter Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage].
13. Leslie Joan Harris, Reforming Paternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Status, and Class Inequali-
ty, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2013) [hereinafter Harris, Reforming Paternity Law].
14. Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217 (Okla. 2015). 
15. Conover v. Conover, 141 A.3d 31, 38 (Md. 2016).
16. Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133 (Mass. 2016).
17. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 28 N.Y.3d 1, 2016 WL 4507780 (N.Y. Aug. 30, 2016).
18. L.P. v. L.F., 338 P.3d 908, 908 (Wyo. 2014).
19. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN:
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these children were married, but three million children, or 4% of all chil-
dren under eighteen, lived with both biological parents who were not mar-
ried to each other.20
On the other hand, almost a third of all children, more than nineteen 
million, did not live with both parents because of the high rates of non-
marital births, divorces, and breakups of informal domestic partnerships. 
Most of them live with their mothers. In 2015, 7.1 million of all children 
lived with a mother who was divorced or separated, while 8.3 million lived 
with a mother who had never been married. Another 1.6 million lived with 
a father who was divorced or separated, and 842,000 lived with a father 
who had never been married.21 The incidence of children not living with 
both parents is unlikely to decline, mostly because of the high non-marital 
birth rate. In 2014, 40.2% of all births in the United States were non-
marital.22
Many children not living with both parents currently live or will live 
in blended families because of the strong tendency of divorced23 and sin-
gle24 parents to form new romantic relationships during their children’s
http://www.census.gov/hhes/families/files/cps2015/tabC2-all.xls [hereinafter ARRANGEMENTS OF 
CHILDREN: 2015] (Household Relationship and Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 years, by 
Age and Sex: 2015). 
20. Id.
21. Some 2.9 million children lived with neither parent. Id. 
22. Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: Final Data for 2014, 64 Nat’l Vital Stat. Rep. 12, tbls.1–4, 
tbl.B (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_12.pdf. Women of color are 
more likely than white women to have children outside marriage. In 2014, 29.2% of births to non-
Hispanic white mothers were non-marital, compared to 52.9% of births to Hispanic mothers, and 70.9% 
to non-Hispanic black mothers. Id.
23. Rose M. Kreider, Remarriage in the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2006), 
https://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/marriage/data/sipp/us-remarriage-poster.pdf. 
24. In the United States, non-marital families are much less stable than marital families. ANDREW 
J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA 
TODAY, (2009); ELIZABETH MARQUARDT ET AL., THE PRESIDENT’S MARRIAGE AGENDA FOR THE 
FORGOTTEN SIXTY PERCENT in THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS, 6–8, 31 (Nat’l Marriage Project & Inst. for 
American Values, 2012). Evidence from the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study, a major 
longitudinal study of about 5,000 children and their parents that includes a disproportionate number of 
non-marital children, shows that the relationships of unmarried parents are fragile; a year after birth, 
48% of the fathers in the study were living away from their child, 56% were at three years and 63% 
were at five years. Marcia J. Carlson, Sara S. McLanahan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Coparenting and 
Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement with Young Children After a Nonmarital Birth, 45 DEMOGRAPHY
461, 461 (2008). The study includes children born in seventy-five hospitals in twenty cities in the U.S. 
with a population over 200,000. The study uses baseline data collected between 1998 and 2000. Moth-
ers and fathers were interviewed at birth, and follow-up interviews were done when the children were 
one, three, and five years old. Results of the study are generalizable to urban areas with a population of 
more than 200,000. SARA MCLANAHAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE FAMILIES AND CHILD WELLBEING STUDY 
in BASELINE NATIONAL REPORT, at *2 (Rev. 2003). Re-partnering was the norm in the Fragile Families 
study. By the time a child was five years old, more than half had seen their mother’s romantic partner 
move out or a new partner move in, 39% had experienced one or two of these changes, and 15% had 
experienced three or four changes. Sara McLanahan, Fragile Families and Children’s Opportunities
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minorities. In 2015, of all adults living with their own children younger 
than eighteen, 14% had been married twice, and 2.3% had been married 
three or more times. Only 11% had never been married.25 And parents of-
ten live with other romantic partners to whom they are not married; in 
2015, 2.4 million children lived in a household that included a parent’s
unmarried opposite-sex partner who was not also the child’s parent.26
While most children live with two opposite-sex parents, almost 
220,000 children lived in a household headed by a same-sex couple in 
2013.27 Of the 783,100 same-sex couples in the United States in 2014, 16% 
were living with at least one child who was the legal child of at least one of 
them.28 In 2013, the Williams Institute reported that nearly half of LGBT 
women are raising a child younger than eighteen, and a fifth of LGBT men 
are.29 Children of same-sex parents also commonly live in blended fami-
lies, since most children being raised by lesbians were conceived in prior 
heterosexual relationships.30
As these data show, of the 30% of American children who do not live 
with both biological parents, most at some point live in a household that 
includes a parent’s new partner, many of whom become caretakers for the 
children.31 In at least some circumstances, these adults become functional 
parents, and both they and the children need legal protection for their rela-
tionships. The same is true for some of the 2.9 million children who live 
with neither parent,32 though they are not the focus of this paper. The next 
section of this paper discusses statutes and case law that provide this pro-
FF.pdf. The average number of residential partner changes was three times higher among unmarried 
mothers than among married mothers. Sara McLanahan & Audrey N. Beck, Parental Relationships in 
Fragile Families, 20 FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2010 at 22. 
25. Jamie M. Lewis & Rose M. Kreider, Remarriage in the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
7 tbl.2 (2015), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/acs/acs-30.pdf.
26. ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 2015, supra note 19, at tbl.C2.
27. GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, LGBT PARENTING IN THE UNITED STATES (2013), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbt-demographics-studies/lgbt-parenting-in-the-
united-states/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
28. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS OF OPPOSITE-SEX AND SAME-SEX 
COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS, tbl.1, (Survey 2014), http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/files/ssex-tables-
2014.xlsx.
29. GATES, supra note 27 at 2. 
30. See Gary J. Gates, Family Formation and Raising Children Among Same-Sex Couples,
FAMILY FOCUS ON LGBT FAMILIES F1 (Winter 2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf.http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbt-
demographics-studies/family-formation-and-raising-children-among-same-sex-couples/; see also Karen
L. Brewster et al., Demographic Characteristics of Lesbian Parents in the United States, 33 
POPULATION RES. POL’Y REV. 503, 524 (2014).
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tection on the express basis of giving legal recognition to functional parent-
child relationships.
II. DE FACTO PARENTHOOD OTHER THEORIES TO RECOGNIZE
FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
The major legal barrier to permitting an adult who is not a child’s bio-
logical or adoptive parent to have access to the child over the parent’s ob-
jection is the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville.33 Troxel is
an ambiguous decision without a plurality opinion, but at its core it pro-
vides due process protection for the childrearing decisions of “fit” parents, 
particularly decisions about whether the children will spend time with other 
adults who are not legal parents. While the dominant interpretation of 
Troxel is that it means a parent’s decision can be overridden to avoid det-
riment to the child, some states require proof that the parent’s decision will 
harm the child or even that the parent is unfit.34
At least thirty-two states have statutes or case law that sometimes al-
lows a functional non-biological parent to seek custody or visitation over a 
legal parent’s objection, notwithstanding Troxel.35 Eight states have stat-
utes that create these rights,36 and another eighteen have cases that recog-
nize a relationship called “de facto parent,” “psychological parent,” or 
person standing “in loco parentis.”37 In some of these states, the de facto 
33. 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
34. See David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles of Family 
Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1075, 1081–1083, 1087 (2001) for discussions about how Troxel
protects parental rights, see generally Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for 
State Courts and Legislatures, 69 LA. L. REV. 927 (2009); Rebecca L. Scharf, Psychological Parent-
age, Troxel, and the Best Interests of the Child, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615 (2012). The Uniform Law 
Commission has published a draft Uniform Non-Parental Rights to Child Custody and Visitation Act 
that discusses Troxel extensively and proposes legislation that is clearly within the boundaries set by the 




35. See also Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Parties to Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and 
Their Children, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 208 (2014); Joslin, Leaving No (Nonmarital) Child 
Behind, supra note 7, at 498–05. 
36. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-123(1)(c) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) 
(2016); D.C. Code §§ 16-831.01–16.831.13 (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(a)(2) (2006); IND.
CODE § 31-17-2-8.5 (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West 2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
228 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1) (2015); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (West 2016). 
37. Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982); Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731, 738 
(Ark. 2011); Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312, 315 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); Laspina-Williams v. Laspina-
Williams, 742 A.2d 840, 843–844 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965, 967 (Ind. 
2005); Conover v. Conover, 141 A.3d 31, 35 (Md. 2016); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 
1999); C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 2004); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151,
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parent has the status of legal parenthood and stands on equal footing with 
other legal parents.38 In others, the de facto parent is not a legal parent and 
must overcome the Troxel presumption that the legal parent’s decisions 
about access control.39 In another five states, courts have held that a statu-
tory presumption that a person taking a child into his or her home and hold-
ing the child our as his or her cannot always be rebutted by evidence that 
the adult is not the child’s biological parent; the effect is that the adult is 
the child’s legal parent.40 Finally, New York has adopted a unique doctrine 
that protects functional parents sometimes. In 2016, the New York Court of 
Appeals in Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C. refused to recognize a broad 
doctrine of de facto parenthood.41 Instead, it adopted what amounts to a 
waiver theory: If the biological parent and the functional parent agreed to 
conceive and raise a child as co-parents, the functional parent has the legal 
status of a parent, and has standing to seek custody because of the agree-
ment.42 On the other hand, courts in at least seven states have recently re-
fused to recognize any of these doctrines or to provide any remedy to 
functional parents.43
Many, but not all, of the cases about whether to recognize de facto 
parenthood or a similar theory were based on disputes between lesbian 
couples at the time their relationships broke up. These include Brooke S.B.
and three other very recent cases. Two of these cases overruled earlier deci-
748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000); Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 504 (N.C. 2010); Ramey v. Sutton, 
362 P.3d 217, 219; Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 
A.2d 959, 968 (R.I. 2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 161 (Wash. 2005) (en banc); In re
Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 155–56 (W. Va. 2005); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435–
36 (Wis. 1995). New York has a different rationale for granting parental status to some functional 
parents and is not included in this count. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 42–44. 
38. See, e.g., C.E.W, 845 A.2d at 1151; V.C., 748 A.2d at 549; In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 
at 180–81. See also Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 931 n.61 (Del. 2011) (citing cases).
39. See e.g., R.D. v. A.H., 912 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 2009).
40. In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002); In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); Elisa B. v. 
Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); In re Parental Responsibilities of A.R.L., 318 P.3d 581 
(Colo. App. 2013); Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013); Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.2d 
1133 (Mass. 2016); In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494, 501 (N.H. 2014); Chatterjee v. 
King, 280 P.3d 283, 288 (N.M. 2012). These cases and the statutes they interpret are discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 113-135.
41. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016). (N.Y. Aug. 30, 2016). For an 
application of Brooke S.B. to a parentage dispute among a gay couple and a surrogate mother, see
Matter of Frank G. v. Renee P.-F., 37 N.Y.S.3d 155 (App. Div. 2016) (gay partner of biological father 
of children has standing to seek custody although surrogacy agreement not enforceable against mother).
42. Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 500.
43. D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So.3d 320, 347 (Fla. 2013); In re Scarlet Z.-D., 11 N.E.3d 360, 360, 
362 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 435 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015); In re Thomp-
son, 11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); In re Hayden C.G-J., No. M2012-02701-COA-R3CV, 
2013 WL 6040348, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2013); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 808 (Utah 
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sions and recognized the de facto parent doctrine,44 and the third ruled that 
a presumption that a person holding out a child as her own cannot neces-
sarily be rebutted by proof that the adult is not the child’s genetic moth-
er.45Acknowledging the constitutional protection for parental decisions 
about who will have access to their children under Troxel, the courts that 
adopted the de facto parent doctrine concluded that acceptance of same-sex 
marriage undermined the premises of the older cases, though they were 
careful to distinguish de facto parents from other adults who might seek 
custody or visitation over a parent’s objection.46 Both courts placed de 
facto parents on a legal par with biological or adoptive parents. In Conover
v. Conover, the Maryland high court wrote:
Additionally, the passage of time and evolving events have rendered [the 
overruled case] obsolete . . . . Maryland’s recognition of same-sex mar-
riage in 2012—Civil Marriage Protection Act, Ch. 2, 2012 Md. Laws 
9—undermines the precedential value of [the overruled case]. Our state’s
recognition of same-sex marriage illustrates the greater acceptance of 
gays and lesbians in the family unit in society . . . .
. . . .
. . . In light of our differentiation . . . between “pure third parties” and 
those persons who are in a parental role, we now make explicit that de 
facto parents are distinct from other third parties. We hold that de facto 
parents have standing to contest custody or visitation and need not show 
parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances before a trial court can 
apply a best interests of the child analysis. The best interests of the child 
standard has been “firmly entrenched in Maryland and is deemed to be of 
transcendent importance.” With this holding we fortify the best interests 
standard by allowing judicial consideration of the benefits a child gains 
when there is consistency in the child’s close, nurturing relationships.47
The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressed similar views in Ramey v. 
Sutton, citing Obergefell as part of the reason to overrule the earlier case 
rejecting de facto parenthood:
Since [the earlier decision], the Supreme Court of the United States 
(“SCOTUS”) has ruled that marriage is a constitutionally guaranteed 
fundamental right for same sex couples in every state in this nation and 
affirming the longstanding constitutional right to have a family and raise 
children, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. –– (2015). Today we 
44. See Conover, 141 A.3d at 35 (overruling Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73 (Md. 2008) 
and Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217).
45. Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2016).
46. However, the Maryland court did not tie legal recognition of functional parents to marriage, 
citing the work of Professor Nancy Polikoff. Id. at 46–47.
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[acknowledge] the rights of a non-biological parent in a same sex (sic) 
relationship who has acted in loco parentis where the couple, prior to . . .
Obergefell, supra, (1) were unable to marry legally; (2) engaged in inten-
tional family planning to have a child and to co-parent; and (3) the bio-
logical parent acquiesced and encouraged the same sex partner’s parental 
role following the birth of the child . . . .
. . . .
. . . We have consistently given compelling consideration to the best in-
terests of the minor child in custody matters. Our long standing jurispru-
dence recognizes the fundamental right of a parent to the companionship, 
care, custody and management of the child as guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution.
We have held that when persons assume the status and obligations of a 
parent without formal adoption they stand in loco parentis to the child 
and, as such, may be awarded custody even against the biological parent. 
Other jurisdictions have relied on this doctrine in finding a former same 
sex partner had standing to bring a child custody action where the bio-
logical parent consented and encouraged her partner to assume the status 
of parent and acquiesced to the partner’s performance of parental duties. 
One court noted that although the biological mother enjoys many rights 
as a parent, it does not include the right to erase a relationship that she 
voluntarily created and fostered with their child.48
Like the two de facto parent decisions, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court case that relied on the holding out presumption to establish 
the legal parentage of the second member of a lesbian couple raising chil-
dren together also recognized the parental rights of the biological mother. 
However, the court said, protecting the children’s interest in preserving the 
actual family relationship with the other mother took precedence.49
In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize a 
broad, de facto parentage doctrine because of Troxel. However, like the 
Maryland and Oklahoma courts, it said that the changing legal position of 
same-sex couples required rejection of a twenty-five-year-old precedent 
that denied all rights to the nonbiological parent when a same-sex couple 
breaks up. In Brooke S.B. the court wrote:
[The overruled case’s] foundational premise of heterosexual parenting 
and nonrecognition of same-sex couples is unsustainable, particularly in 
light of the enactment of same-sex marriage in New York State, and the 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell v. Hodges (576 
U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 2584 [2015]), which noted that the right to marry 
48. 362 P.3d at 218, 221 (footnotes omitted).
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provides benefits not only for same-sex couples, but also the children be-
ing raised by those couples.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the stigma suffered by the “hun-
dreds of thousands of children [who] are presently being raised by 
[same-sex] couples” (Obergefell, 135 S Ct at 2600–2608). By “fixing bi-
ology as the key to visitation rights, the [overruled case] inflicted dispro-
portionate hardship on the growing number of nontraditional families 
across our State . . . .
. . . .
. . . We must, however, protect the substantial and fundamental right of 
biological or adoptive parents to control the upbringing of their children. 
For certainly, “the interest of parents in the care, custody and control of 
their children [ ] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty inter-
ests,” and any infringement on that right “comes with an obvious cost”
(Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64–65). But here we do not consider whether to al-
low a third party to contest or infringe on those rights; rather, the issue is 
who qualifies as a “parent” with coequal rights. Nevertheless, the fun-
damental nature of those rights mandates caution in expanding the defi-
nition of that term and makes the element of consent of the biological or 
adoptive parent critical . . . .
. . . We reject the premise that we must now declare that one test would 
be appropriate for all situations, or that the proffered tests are the only 
options that should be considered . . . .
. . . .
. . . Petitioners in the two cases before us have alleged that the parties en-
tered into a pre-conception agreement to conceive and raise a child as co-
parents. We hold that these allegations, if proven by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, are sufficient to establish standing. Because we necessarily 
decide these cases based on the facts presented to us, it would be prema-
ture for us to consider adopting a test for situations in which a couple did 
not enter into a pre-conception agreement. Accordingly, we do not now 
decide whether, in a case where a biological or adoptive parent consent-
ed to the creation of a parent-like relationship between his or her partner 
and child after conception, the partner can establish standing to seek vis-
itation and custody.50
In sharp contrast to the cases from Maryland, Massachusetts, Oklaho-
ma and New York, the Wyoming Supreme Court in 2014 refused to pro-
vide any relief to a functional parent when the biological parent sought to 
deny him visitation. Unlike the other three cases, the Wyoming case, L.P. 
v. L.F., involved an opposite-sex couple.51 The mother and the man were 
living together when the child was born, and he was listed as the father on 
the birth certificate, though he was not the biological father. They lived 
50. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016).
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together for the first eighteen to twenty-one months of the child’s life, sepa-
rated, and then lived together again briefly. After a separation, they lived 
near each other for five more years, though they did not live together. The 
man helped support the child and saw him regularly, and the child regarded 
him as his father. For undisclosed reasons, the mother then filed a petition 
to disprove the father-child relationship.52 The man argued that even if he 
was not the child’s biological father, the court should adopt the de facto
parent doctrine and grant him parental rights. The court refused, finding 
that the legislature intended the state parentage statutes—which are based 
on the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)—to cover all theories upon which a 
nonparent might claim a right to a relationship with a child.53
In sum, while the de facto parent doctrine and related theories protect 
functional parent-child relationships where they are recognized, they have 
not been adopted in almost half the states. In some states, such as Oklaho-
ma, there is a question about the applicability of the doctrine where parents 
could marry but choose not to.54 The next two sections examine traditional 
principles of the law of paternity that fill this gap in some places and to 
some extent.
III. THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION – PARENTAGE BASED ON MARRIAGE
TO A CHILD’S LEGAL PARENT AT BIRTH
As discussed in the introduction to this article, all states presume the 
husband of a married woman to be the father of her children born during 
the marriage. Obergefell raises the question of whether the marital pre-
sumption applies if the married couple is same-sex. A related question is 
whether state laws providing that a child born to a married woman via arti-
ficial insemination with her husband’s consent is the legal child of the hus-
band apply to married same-sex couples. While this rule is not on its face 
the same as the marital presumption, it is rooted in the same principles, and 
advances the same policies as the marital presumption. This section first 
examines whether these rules apply to married lesbian couples, including 
whether application of the rules is constitutionally required after Oberge-
52. If the man had lived with the child for the first two years of his life, he would have been 
presumed to be the child’s father, and the statute of limitations on legal actions to challenge that pre-
sumption would have run. Id. at 911. The court rejected the man’s argument that he had substantially 
complied with the statute creating the presumption and said that even if the presumption applied, it was 
rebutted by genetic evidence showing that he was not the biological father. Id. at 914-15. For a discus-
sion of the presumption of legal paternity based on living with a child and holding out the child as one’s
own, see infra text accompanying notes 113–35.
53. L.P. v. L.F., 338 P.3d 908, 919 (Wyo. 2014). 
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fell. It then considers the applicability of these principles when the partners 
are men. It concludes with a discussion of what happens when the marital 
presumption is challenged on the basis that the mother’s spouse is not the 
child’s biological parent.
A. Applicability of the Marital Presumption to Lesbian Couples55
The marital presumption, which has very old, common-law roots, ap-
plies to married opposite-sex couples in all states.56 While some scholars 
have argued that the primary purpose and effect of the presumption is to 
allow married couples an easy way to establish the legal parent-child rela-
tionship based on biology,57since. most husbands are in fact the biological 
fathers of their wives’ children,58 the rule does more than this. In the great 
majority of cases, the presumption also protects the functional parent-child 
relationship and the integrity of the marriage, since no effort is made to 
rebut the presumption.
Whether the marital presumption applies to lesbian couples depends in 
the first instance on whether the court treats the presumption as pertaining 
55. For an early discussion of these issues, see generally Susan F. Appleton, Presuming Women: 
Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227 (2006).
56. On the marital presumption generally, see Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating 
the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547 (2000); June Carbone, 
The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 
1304–08 (2005) [hereinafter Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood]; Jana Singer, Marriage,
Biology and Paternity, The Case for Revitalizing the Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 248–55
(2006); Melanie Jacobs, Overcoming the Marital Presumption, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 289, 290 (2012).
57. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind?: Redefining the Parent-Child 
Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1021–22 (2003). But 
see Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood, supra note 56, at 1305. 
58. Empirical studies show that almost always men who believe themselves to be the fathers of 
children are in fact the fathers. A study published in 2013 reconstructing large family genealogies back 
four centuries in Belgium found a cuckoldry rate of less than 1%. M.H.D. Larmuseau et al., Low histor-
ical rates of cuckoldry in a Western European human population traced by Y-chromosome and genea-
logical data, 280 PROC. R. SOC. B 280:20132400 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10/1098/rspb.2013.2400. 
Similar studies have found similar rates in Spain, Italy, Germany and agricultural villages in Mali. Carl 
Zimmer, Fathered by the Mailman? It’s Mostly an Urban Legend, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2016, at *A1. 
The most comprehensive analysis of U.S. data concluded that 98% of the men raising children they 
believe to be their biological children are correct. Kermyt G. Anderson, How Well Does Paternity 
Confidence Match Actual Paternity? Results from Worldwide Nonpaternity Rates, 47 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 511, 516 (2006), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237633127_How_Well_Does_Paternity_Confidence_Match_
Actual_Paternity_Evidence_from_Worldwide_Nonpaternity_Rates. 
The rate of non-paternity is much higher for men who seek genetic tests to determine their paternity. A 
study conducted in the mid-2000s found that, for any man who was tested for paternity in a child sup-
port office, there was a 72% probability that the test would show that he is the father. The rate varied 
little across racial or ethnic lines. The differences among racial and ethnic groups were not statistically 
significant. David Bishai, A National Sample of US Paternity Tests: Do Demographics Predict Test 
Outcomes? 46 TRANSFUSION 849, 852–53 (May 2006). See also Anderson, supra note 58, at 5 (30% of 
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only to biological parenthood. Relatively few states with laws addressing 
civil unions, comprehensive domestic partnerships, or same-sex marriages 
addressed this question before Obergefell was decided; of those that did, 
most held that lesbian couples are entitled to the benefit of the presumption 
as one of the benefits of marriage. In an early decision, following the hold-
ing in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health that same-sex marriage 
must be recognized under the state constitution,59 the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court recognized a California domestic partnership as 
equivalent to marriage, and then applied the marital presumption.60 Within 
a few years, courts in Connecticut61 and Iowa62 reached the same conclu-
sion under their own statutes and case law. The Arizona Court of Appeals 
held that, in light of Obergefell, the marital presumption applies to a mar-
ried lesbian couple,63 and in dicta, an intermediate Missouri Appellate 
Court indicated that it would reach the same conclusion.64
However, strong dicta in a 2009 Oregon Court of Appeals decision 
said that the marital presumption could not apply to a same-sex couple 
because it is based on biology,65 a position that it reaffirmed in 2015.66
Similarly, dicta in a 2015 Florida case suggested strongly that the marital 
presumption would not apply to a same-sex couple, relying on a 1993 case 
holding that a husband who was living with the mother when her child was 
born and raised the child did not have standing to seek visitation when the 
parties divorced.67 Both of these cases were decided before Obergefell,
59. 798 N.E.2d 941, 968–70 (Mass. 2003). 
60. Hunter v. Rose, 975 N.E.2d 857, 857 (Mass. 2012).
61. See Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 2015) 
(civil union).
62. Gartner v. Iowa Dept. Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 351 (Iowa 2013). In contrast, in 2015 
the Iowa Supreme Court held that a husband who was married to the mother at the child’s birth and who 
had raised the child, but who was clearly not a child’s biological father, had no rights in a juvenile court 
dependency case because the statute speaks of biological and adoptive parents. In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 
495, 508 (Iowa 2014). Whether the legislature intended to use the statute to exclude the husband is far 
from certain, though. On the treatment of fathers in dependency cases generally, see Leslie J. Harris, 
Involving Nonresident Fathers in Dependency Cases: New Efforts, New Problems, New Solutions, 9 J.
L. & FAM. STUD. 281, 282 (2007). 
63. McLaughlin v. Jones, 2016 WL 5929205 (Az. App. 2016).
64. McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
65. Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 36 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (“By the very terms of the 
statute, for the presumption of parentage to apply, it must be at least possible that the person is the 
biological parent of the child.”).
66. In re Madrone, 350 P.3d 495, 501 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). Both Madrone and Shineovich in-
volved lesbian couples who were not married or in a domestic partnership when their children were 
born because the laws at the time did not allow them to be. The women who were not the biological 
mothers successfully argued that a statute concerning a husband who consents to his wife’s artificial 
insemination applied to them so as to make them legal parents of their mates’ children. 
67. Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 59 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing O’Dell v. O’Dell, 
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however, and so they do not address whether the constitution requires ex-
tending the presumption to same-sex couples.68 The lower courts in New 
York are divided about whether the marital presumption applies to same-
sex couples,69 although the New York Court of Appeals decision in Brooke
S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.70 better comports with the decisions applying the 
presumption. This is so because most of the time when a child is born to a 
same-sex couple, they will have agreed to raise the child together, which 
gives the biological mother’s partner parental status under Brooke S.B.71
B. Applicability of Artificial Insemination Statutes to Lesbian Couples
If a married woman conceives by artificial insemination by donor, and 
the marital presumption in her state is rebuttable by evidence that her hus-
band is not the biological father, his legal paternity would be vulnerable. In 
fact, in some early cases, courts held that the children were not the hus-
band’s legal issue, even though he had consented to the procedure.72 To
avoid this outcome, a number of states have enacted statutes providing that 
when a husband consents to his wife’s artificial insemination, he is the 
legal father.73 Before Obergefell, courts in some states applied these stat-
utes to lesbians who were married, in civil unions, or in domestic partner-
ships,74 although other courts did not.75 In 2015, a Michigan appellate court 
applied Obergefell to reach the same result,76 and in 2016 the Indiana Court 
of Appeals applied to a lesbian couple its case law rule that a child con-
68. For a discussion of this issue, see infra Part III.C.
69. Compare Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M, 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (extending 
marital presumption to same-sex couples) with Paczkowski v. Paczkowski, 10 N.Y.S.3d 270, 271 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2015) (finding non-biological parent lacked standing to challenge custody absent extraordi-
nary circumstances) and Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470, 473–74 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014) (holding 
marital presumption did not establish that biological mother’s wife was child’s second mother). 
70. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016).
71. See id.
72. Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), superseded by statute NY
DOM. REL. LAW § 24 (McKinney 2008); see also Wellborn v. Doe, 394 S.E.2d 732, 734 (Va. Ct. App. 
1990).
73. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46 § 4B (West, Westlaw through ch. 260 (excluding ch. 
218, 2016 2d Ann. Sess.)); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243, invalidated by Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 
P.3d 29, 37 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
74. Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601, 603 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012); Wendy G-M., 985 
N.Y.S.2d at 845. 
75. Dubose v. North, 332 P.3d 311, 312 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014), overruled by Ramey v. Sutton, 
362 P.3d 217, 221 (Okla. 2015).
76. Stankevich v. Milliron, 882 N.W.2d 194, 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015); see also In re Kelly S. 
v. Farah M., 28 N.Y.S.3d 714, 715 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Counihan v. Bishop, 974 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 
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ceived during marriage with the consent of both spouses is the child of both 
of them, though it did not invoke Obergefell.77
C. Does the Constitution Require Applying the Parentage Rules to 
Same-sex Couples?
Since Obergefell, two federal district courts have held that states’ re-
fusals to extend the marital presumption to a woman whose wife gives birth 
during the marriage violates equal protection, due process, or both. In Hen-
derson v. Adams, the Indiana department of vital statistics refused to allow 
both women’s names to be on the child’s birth certificate on the basis that 
the wives of the biological mothers were not legal parents under state 
law.78 The women sued, alleging that the state law violated equal protec-
tion and due process because they created a presumption of parenthood for 
husbands, but not wives, of birth mothers. The court granted their motion 
for summary judgment. On similar facts, the Utah federal district court in 
Roe v. Patton also ruled in favor of the biological mother and her wife.79
In Henderson, the more extensive of the two opinions, the court ruled 
that the state’s action was subject to heightened scrutiny because the state 
was applying the marital presumption differently based on gender and sex 
classifications. The state argued that its position was supported by its inter-
ests in protecting the rights of biological fathers and maintaining accurate 
records of children’s biological parentage. The court rejected this argu-
ment, saying:
The Court is not convinced that the challenged Parenthood Statutes are 
substantially related or narrowly tailored to meet the stated interests of 
preserving the rights of biological fathers and maintaining accurate rec-
ords of biological parentage . . . .
. . . .
. . . During oral argument, the State Defendant asserted that the birth 
mother should not name her husband as the father of the child when a 
third-party sperm donor is involved. However, as noted above, common 
sense says that she will name her husband as the father. Whether she 
names her husband as the father or states that she is not married to the fa-
ther, the biological father’s parental rights are not preserved and accurate 
77. Gardenour v. Bondelie, No. 32A01-1601-DR-82, 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 290, at *19–22 (Ind. 
Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2016). See also Matter of L., 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3674 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.) (apply-
ing artificial insemination statute to married same-sex couples but also allowing the nonbiological 
mother to adopt the children because her legal relationship to the children based on the statute is not 
recognized in some countries).
78. Henderson v. Adams, No. 1:15-cv-00220-TWP-MJD, 2016 WL 3548645, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. 
June 30, 2016).
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records of biological parentage are not maintained. If the mother names 
her husband, the third-party sperm donor who is the biological father is 
not listed on the birth certificate. If the mother says she is not married to 
the father, the third-party sperm donor who is the biological father still is 
not listed on the birth certificate. In either event, the State’s interests in 
preserving the rights of biological fathers and maintaining accurate rec-
ords of biological parentage are not served.80
Obergefell, the court said, “stands for the proposition that any benefit 
of marriage must now be extended to same-sex married couples on an 
equal basis with opposite-sex married couples. But this is exactly what the 
Plaintiffs seek—the extension of a benefit of marriage on an equal basis.”81
Turning to the plaintiff’s due process claim, the court said:
The Supreme Court long ago recognized a fundamental liberty interest 
“to marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . .”
. . . .
. . . The Parenthood Statutes and the State Defendant’s implementation 
of the statutes . . . significantly interferes (sic) with the Plaintiffs’ exer-
cise of the right to be a parent by denying them any opportunity for a 
presumption of parenthood which is offered to heterosexual couples. 
What Plaintiffs seek is for their families to be respected in their dignity 
and treated with consideration . . . . As previously stated, the Parenthood 
Statutes are not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental in-
terest. By refusing to grant the presumption of parenthood to same-sex 
married women, the State Defendant violates the Plaintiffs’ fundamental 
right to parenthood under the Due Process Clause.82
D. What About Married Gay Men?
As Susan Appleton has written, on policy grounds there seems to be 
no principled reason that the marital presumption would not apply to two 
married men, one of whom is the biological father of a child who was born 
to a “surrogate” with the assistance of reproductive technology.83 However,
for practical reasons, the marital presumption is not important for establish-
ing the legal paternity of a biological father’s male spouse.
In some states, statutes determine the parentage of a child born 
through assisted reproductive technology, though they vary considerably.84
80. Henderson, 2016 WL 3548645, *12–13. 
81. Id. at *13.
82. Id. at *14–15.
83. Appleton, supra note 55, at 260–61.
84. See COURTNEY JOSLIN & SHANNON P. MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND 
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 3:3 (Westlaw, Thomson Reuters, 2016). For a summary of the states’
approaches to this situation, see June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption 
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If the statutes allow the sperm donor/intended father to become the legal 
father, they will probably allow for his spouse to become a parent as well.
If there are no special statutes, generally applicable family law rules 
are applied, and some kind of legal process for establishing paternity of the 
man who provided the sperm to conceive the child will be required.85 If the 
biological mother of the child, the “surrogate,” is not married, she and the 
biological father could establish his legal parentage by signing and filing 
with the state a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity.86 On the other 
hand, if the mother is married, the presumption of her husband’s legal pa-
ternity must first be rebutted through some kind of legal proceeding.87 In
either case, however, absent a special reproductive technology statute, the 
mother remains a legal parent, and ordinarily the parties will want to elimi-
nate that legal relationship. This would require a legal proceeding, such as 
an adoption or an action for termination of parental rights. During that legal 
proceeding, the legal parentage of the biological father’s husband could be 
established as well.88 Thus, there is rarely, if ever, a practical occasion for 
invoking the marital presumption when the married couple is male.89
E. Obergefell’s Implications for Rebutting the Marital Presumption
Although at common-law the marital presumption for opposite-sex 
married couples was conclusive unless the husband had literally been out of 
the country when the child could have been conceived,90 in most states 
85. On the legal position of unmarried fathers generally, see Part IV.A. infra.
86. For a discussion of voluntary acknowledgments of paternity, see infra text accompanying 
notes 100–14. 
87. Under the Uniform Parentage Act, the husband can sign a document disclaiming paternity at 
the same time the biological father signs the acknowledgment of paternity, and both can be filed. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT §§ 301–305 (2002). These provisions of the act have been adopted in Delaware, 
Illinois, Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-301 to -305 (2016); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/301 to -305 (2015); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 1861–1865 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11a-301 to -305 (West 2009); 
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-20-11 to -15 (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7700-301 to -305 (West 
2016); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.301–305 (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78b-15-301 to -305; 
(West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.300–320 (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-601 to -605
(2016). Alabama, however, omitted these sections when it adopted its Parentage Act. ALA. CODE. § 26-
17-302 (2008).
88. In 2016, a Mississippi federal district held that a Mississippi statute that barred couples of the 
same gender from adopting children was unconstitutional under Obergefell. The statute was the last 
remaining express statutory ban in the country. Campaign for S. Equal. v. Mississippi Dep’t of Human 
Serv., 175 F. Supp. 3d 691 (S. D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2016).
89. Thanks to Professor Richard Storrow for helping me think this through.
90. At common law the marital presumption could be rebutted only by showing that the husband 
had been out of the kingdom of England for more than nine months. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, *287. See generally MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND 
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 207–15 (1985) on developments in the American colonies. 
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today, when the spouses are opposite-sex, the presumption may be rebutted 
with genetic evidence.91 But when the marital presumption is invoked in 
the context of a same-sex marriage, it would be nonsensical for this rebuttal 
rule to apply, since the spouse of the woman who bore the child will by 
definition not be related to the child (except in the case where she provided 
the egg that became the child). To recognize the marital presumption for 
same-sex couples is equivalent to recognizing that the spouse of the person 
who bore the child is a legal parent because she is the intended parent, the 
functional parent, or both. If the Constitution does indeed compel the con-
clusion that the marital presumption is a benefit of marriage to which same-
sex couples are entitled, the Constitution compels recognition that at least 
sometimes legal parenthood must be based on function or intention. The 
question courts will have to confront is how this development affects the 
law governing rebuttal of the marital presumption for opposite-sex couples.
In many circumstances, state law precludes rebuttal of the marital pre-
sumption because the challenger lacks standing, a statute of limitations has 
run, the challenger is estopped from rebutting the presumption, or rebuttal 
is contrary to the child’s interests. For example, the Uniform Parentage Act 
(“UPA”) of 2002 grants standing to rebut the presumption to the child, the 
mother, a man whose paternity is to be adjudicated (including a legal father 
and an alleged father), the state child support enforcement agency, and 
adoption agencies.92 Under the UPA, an action must be brought within two 
years of the child’s birth,93 and courts have discretion to deny a motion for 
genetic testing based on findings that a party is estopped from denying 
paternity or that allowing testing or disestablishing paternity would be con-
trary to the child’s best interests.94 Even without a statute, a number of 
testimony that cast doubt on the husband’s biological paternity. Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 
1257 (KB 1777). Together these rules kept out of court highly reliable evidence that a child was not in 
fact the husband’s biological child. 
91. A few states still recognize a conclusive presumption of paternity in limited circumstances. 
For example, in California and Oregon, third parties cannot challenge the presumption if the marriage is 
intact and the spouses object to the third party challenge. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7540–7541 (West 2004); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.070(2) (2015). The constitutionality of an earlier version of the California con-
clusive presumption was upheld against a biological father’s due process challenge in Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118–30 (1988).
92. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 602 (2002).
93. Id. § 607(a). If the presumed father and the mother did not cohabit or engage in sex at the 
probable time of conception, and if the presumed father never held out the child as his, the action may 
be maintained at any time. Id. § 607(b).
94. Id. § 608. For a detailed discussion of similar provisions in current state statutes, see Harris, 
Reforming Paternity Law, supra note 13 at 1308–13. At least six states statutes deny standing to men to 
challenge the marital presumption based on a claim to have fathered the child of a woman married to 
someone else. And a number have short statutes of limitations on challenges, grant courts authority to 
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courts have held that genetic evidence offered to rebut the presumption can 
be excluded to protect the child’s best interests.95 Other courts have 
reached the same result on the basis that the party offering the rebuttal evi-
dence is estopped from denying parentage because of the detrimental reli-
ance of the other party or, sometimes, the child.96
Obergefell does not directly require that any of these rules apply when 
the couple is opposite-sex, since it does not address the rights of opposite-
sex couples. On the other hand, the key assumption underlying the Oberge-
fell discussion of marriage and parenthood is that when a same-sex couple 
is raising a child together by mutual agreement, they are both parents. As a 
matter of equal protection, members of opposite-sex couples should have 
the same protection when they are raising a child together, regardless of 
whether the husband is the biological father. At a minimum, outsiders to 
the marriage should not be able to challenge the husband’s legal parentage 
based on biology. Further, since neither spouse in a same-sex marriage 
should be able to rebut the marital presumption based on lack of biological 
relationship, the same should be true for spouses in an opposite-sex mar-
riage.97 Whether the courts will agree with this position is, however, uncer-
tain, of course.
While Obergefell very likely requires that same-sex couples have the 
benefit of the marital presumption, and while it provides support for pro-
95. See Ban v. Quigley, 812 P.2d 1014, 1018–19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (remanding for determina-
tion of whether allowing putative father’s attempt to require blood test would be in best interests of 
child); Williamson v. Williamson, 690 S.E.2d 257, 258–59 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); In re Marriage of Ross, 
783 P.2d 331, 338–39 (Kan. 1989) (remanding for determination of whether allowing mother’s attempt 
to require blood tests would be in best interests of child); Turner v. Whisted, 607 A.2d 935, 940 (Md. 
1992) (remanding for determination of whether allowing putative father’s attempt to require blood test 
would be in best interests of child); B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368, 378 (N.D. 1993) (refusing putative 
father’s attempt to require blood test to determine paternity); Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 
866, 872–73 (W. Va. 1989) (remanding for determination whether admission of blood tests showing 
husband was not father, at husband’s request in divorce action, was in best interests of child); In re
Paternity of C.A.S., 468 N.W.2d 719, 729 (Wis. 1991) (applying statute and refusing putative father’s
attempt to require blood test to determine paternity); In re Adoption of R.S.C., 837 P.2d 1089, 1092–94
(Wyo. 1992) (holding that presumptive but not biological father’s status could not be challenged later 
by mother in effort to have child adopted by another man). For a discussion of this kind of case, as well 
as other judicial strategies to prevent challenges to the marital presumption to protect the child’s inter-
ests, see Harris, Reforming Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1314–17. 
96. See In re Marriage of K.E.V., 883 P.2d 1246, 1252–53 (Mont. 1994) (mother’s actions es-
topped her from challenging husband’s paternity); M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 498 A.2d 775, 779–81 (N.J. 1985) 
(father’s actions estopped him from challenging his paternity); K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.2d 798, 810 (Pa. 
2012) (mother’s actions may estop her from challenging husband’s paternity); Pettinato v. Pettinato, 
582 A.2d 909, 912–13 (R.I. 1990) (mother’s actions estopped her from challenging husband’s paterni-
ty); In re Adoption of R.S.C., 837 P.2d at 1093–95 (same). For further discussion, see Reforming 
Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1315–18.
97. For other perspectives on this issue, see Carbone & Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Pre-
sumption Post-Obergefell, supra note 84, at 667; Paula A. Monopoli, Inheritance law and the Marital 
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tecting the parentage of spouses against challenges based on biology, the 
extent of that support is far from clear. Further, the opinion does not direct-
ly address the parentage of the many children who are born to unmarried 
couples, either same-sex or opposite-sex. The next section turns to this 
topic.
IV. THE LEGAL PARENTAGE OF NON-MARITAL CHILDREN
The routes to legal paternity for unmarried men are, for the most part, 
rooted in the biological relationship. However, several doctrines expressly 
or in effect allow men who are not biological fathers to attain legal 
parenthood (without adopting). In most states, though, a legal finding that 
an unmarried man is a child’s legal father is vulnerable to challenge on the 
basis that he is not the biological father.
On its face, Obergefell has nothing to say about the extension of these 
legal principles to same-sex couples because of its focus on marriage. Nev-
ertheless, its implicit premise that functional parent-child relationships 
should be protected could support a refusal to allow challenges to legal 
parentage based on lack of biological connection. Whether courts will be 
willing to take those steps is far from certain, and, at least in some states, 
seems unlikely.
A. Unmarried Fathers’ Routes to Legal Paternity
The only legal parent of a non-marital child at the time of birth is the 
mother. Nothing like the marital presumption exists to identify anyone else 
as a possible parent. Indeed, well into the twentieth century, many non-
marital children simply did not have legal fathers who could claim custodi-
al rights, though if the biological father could be identified, his paternity 
might be established through a legal proceeding for the purpose of impos-
ing a child support obligation on him.98 However, under the law of most 
states today, once a man’s paternity is established, he has the same rights 
and duties as a married father, at least in theory.99 But still, his paternity 
must be legally established first.
98. At common law, non-marital children were bastards—the children of no one. 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 90, at *454, *458–59. By the early nineteenth century, they were recognized as the legal 
children of their mothers in most American states. GROSSBERG, supra note 90, at 207–15. 
99. Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s held that discrimination against non-marital children 
violated equal protection, and called into doubt laws denying custodial rights to unmarried fathers. See
e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, (1968); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 
U.S. 535 (1973); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). In response, the 1973 Uniform Parentage 
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While all states have statutes that create legal proceedings to establish 
paternity (sometimes called filiation actions), the paternity of the great 
majority of children born outside marriage today is established by a volun-
tary acknowledgment of paternity (VAP). A VAP is a document signed by 
a child’s mother and the putative father that identifies the man as the fa-
ther.100 There is no requirement that genetic testing precede signing the 
documents, and most VAPs are signed at the time of birth at the hospital or 
other birthing facility, usually without genetic testing having been done.101
When the document is filed with the state office of vital statistics, it estab-
lishes legal paternity and has the effect of a judgment of paternity.102 In
2015, 1.07 million of the 1.49 million cases in which paternity was estab-
lished were done by a VAP.103
Federal and state laws provide that a VAP may be revoked at-will by 
either signatory for 60 days; after that, it can be set aside only on the basis 
of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact.104 The UPA provisions regard-
ing challenges to VAPs after the first sixty days limit standing to the child, 
the mother, and a man whose paternity is to be adjudicated (the legal father 
or an alleged father), subject to a two-year statute of limitations running 
from the date of the VAP.105 Court-ordered genetic testing is the only basis 
for setting aside a VAP,106 and—as is the case with children born to mar-
ried women—courts have authority to deny requests for genetic testing 
based on findings that the challenger is estopped from denying paternity 
and that allowing testing or disestablishing paternity would be contrary to 
child, the rights and duties attendant to that relationship should be the same as for all other parents and 
children. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 1–2 (1973). 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C).
101. MICH. OFF. OF CHILD SUPPORT, STATE OF MICHIGAN, One Year Pilot Summary, in 100%
PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT PROGRAM 8 (2001). In study of 1,660 unwed births at hospitals, paternity 
was voluntarily established in 78.5% of the cases, but in only 112 cases was a genetic test requested 
before an acknowledgment of paternity was signed.
102. Federal law requires states to have legislation authorizing VAPS as a condition of the states’
participation in the federal public welfare and child welfare programs. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)–(D) 
(2012). The federal child support program and its state law requirements are described in Leslie J. 
Harris, Questioning Child Support Enforcement Policy for Poor Families, 45 FAM. L. Q. 157, 167–68
(2011). Article 3 of the Uniform Parentage Act is a model statute for state law establishing VAPs. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT (2002).
103. OFF. OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, FY 2015 PRELIMINARY REPORT, 7 tbl.P-2, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/fy2015_preliminary.pdf.
104. More specifically, either party must be able to rescind the acknowledgment within sixty days 
of the signing or the date of any judicial or administrative proceeding relating to the child, whichever 
occurs first. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii). Because the federal laws are so specific on these points, state 
laws are fundamentally similar. For examples, see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 307, 308 (2002). 
105. Id. §§ 602, 609, 307, 308. 
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the child’s best interests.107 Actual state law on challenges to VAPS is 
highly variable.108 While eight states have statutes substantially similar to 
the UPA, more than half say that in some circumstances genetic evidence 
alone may be sufficient to set aside a VAP.109 Eighteen of these states, like 
the UPA, give courts discretion to refuse to set aside a VAP based on es-
toppel or the best interests of the child.110 In states without governing stat-
utes, case law is also mixed, often allowing a VAP to be set aside based on 
genetic evidence (unless the facts support an estoppel claim).111
The 1973 and 2002 UPAs also provide a second, informal way for a 
man to become a legal father. They provide that a man who takes a child 
into his home and holds out the child as his is rebuttably presumed to be the 
father.112 Nineteen states have statutes modeled on the uniform acts.113 The
Uniform Act places the same limits on rebutting this presumption as those 
that apply to the marital presumption.114 Just as state law about rebutting 
the marital presumption varies, so does state law about rebutting this pre-
107. Id. §§ 608, 609.
108. With the dramatic increase in voluntary paternity establishments early in a child’s life (and 
the great improvements in genetic testing) has come an increase in the occasions for legal fathers to 
question their paternity. Another driver of the increase in paternity disestablishment efforts is the ag-
gressive efforts by state governments to establish paternity of non-marital children as a step toward 
collecting child support from nonresident fathers. Such suits are usually brought against poor people 
(where both mother and child are receiving public assistance), and state laws, in compliance with 
federal laws, allow the suits to be settled without genetic test or resolved by default against the alleged 
father. See Reforming Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1319–20.
109. See Reforming Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1321–27.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1327–35.
112. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (1973). The 2002 Act’s requirements are stricter than those of the 
1973 Act; most importantly, the man must have lived with the child for two years, starting at birth. 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 201(b)(1), 204(5) (amended 2002).
113. The states with “holding-out” statutes are Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. Seven of the states with 
holding out statutes follow the 2002 UPA by requiring that the man live with the child during the first 
two years of the child’s life, and the other twelve impose no time limit. ALA. CODE. § 26-17-204(a)(5) 
(2008); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(d) (West 
2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(b) (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 584-4(a)(4) (West, 
Westlaw through Act 1 (End), 2016 2d Spec. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-7-2 (West 2016); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C § 6(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 260 (excluding ch. 218, 2016 2d 
Sess.) (man and mother must have received child into their home and held out child as theirs); MINN.
STAT. § 257.55 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(1)(d) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-
B:3(1)(d) (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(5) (West 2016); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-204 (2010); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.051(1)(d) (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-10(1)(e) (2016); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. § tit. 10, § 7700-204(5) (West 2016); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102(b)(2) 
(West 2016); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.116(2) 
(2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(v) (2016). 
114. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. The UPA provisions regarding rebuttal of 
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sumption. In most states, unless a statute of limitations has run, a court has 
held that a challenger is estopped to deny the man’s paternity, or a court 
has held that rebutting the presumption is contrary to the child’s interest, 
genetic evidence will be admitted to rebut the “holding-out” presump-
tion.115
The leading exception to the principle that biology rebuts the holding-
out presumption is developed in a line of California cases. The first case 
was In re Nicholas H., where the California Supreme Court held that the 
presumption is not necessarily rebutted by such evidence when the result 
would be to leave a child “fatherless and homeless.”116 In that case, the 
man had lived with the mother for some time during her pregnancy, and his 
name was on the child’s birth certificate, but everyone agreed that he was 
not the biological father. The biological father was known, but he had nev-
er had contact with the child, and his location was unknown. When the 
child came before the juvenile court on allegations that he was dependent 
because of his mother’s inability to care for him, the man came forward 
and claimed paternity, invoking the holding-out presumption. The juvenile 
court refused to rebut the presumption, and the California Supreme Court 
affirmed, citing supporting decisions from the intermediate California ap-
pellate courts.117 The effect was to provide a legal parent to a child who 
otherwise would have gone into the foster care system, perhaps never to be 
reunited with his mother or his absent biological father.
In a second juvenile court dependency case, In re Jesusa V., the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that a husband who relied on the marital pre-
sumption as well as the holding-out presumption prevailed over the 
biological father, who was incarcerated for raping the mother and who also 
claimed the benefit of the holding-out presumption.118 The husband had 
been separated from the mother for three years, but she visited with him 
and supported his claim that he had held out as the father. In upholding the 
husband’s argument not to rebut the presumptions of paternity in his favor, 
the court said, “the Legislature did not envision an automatic preference for 
biological fathers, even if the biological father has come forward to assert 
his rights.”119 Inter alia, it cited a statute providing that when paternity 
presumptions favor two different men, the court should favor the one 
115. A recent case reaching this result is L.P. v. L.F., 338 P.3d 908, 908 (Wyo. 2014).
116. 46 P.3d 932, 934 (Cal. 2002).
117. Id. at 937–41.
118. 85 P.3d 2, 14 (Cal. 2004).
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founded on weightier considerations of policy and logic.120 Instead, the 
court said, a court must consider whether rebutting a presumption would be 
“appropriate” under the circumstances. On these facts, ruling for the hus-
band was appropriate because of his substantial relationship with the child 
and the biological father’s relative lack of involvement (not to mention his 
inability to care for the child because of his incarceration).121
While both the VAP and the holding-out presumption typically identi-
fy a child’s biological father, both can also serve to give legal protection to 
relationships between children and men who are raising them, even though 
the men and the children are not biologically related. Genetic testing is not 
a prerequisite to signing a VAP or a condition that must be satisfied before 
the presumption arises. If neither a VAP nor the presumption is challenged, 
no question is raised about the biological relationship, and a non-biological 
functional father can be recognized as a legal father. Further, in some 
states, a court may reject a challenge to a VAP or the holding-out presump-
tion based on estoppel or the child’s interests.
B. Applying Unmarried Fathers’ Law to Same-Sex Partners
In six states, the holding-out presumption has been deployed to protect 
the relationship between a lesbian who raised a child with the child’s bio-
logical mother, but who was not married to the mother and who did not 
120. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 11–12 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612 (West 2004)). In all states, 
two or even three different men may benefit from a presumption of paternity: the husband from the 
marital presumption, another from the holding-out presumption, and a third man from a presumption 
based on positive results of genetic testing. Federal child support law requires state law to create a 
rebuttable presumption, or—at the option of the state—a conclusive presumption of paternity when 
genetic test results indicate a threshold probability that the alleged father is the father of the child. 42 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(G) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-229). Of course, two presumptions (or 
even all three) can also benefit the same man. When the presumptions clash, in most states, the pre-
sumption that prevails is the one that advances the child’s best interests, which often results in preserv-
ing the husband’s functional relationship with the child rather than establishing the legal paternity of the 
biological father. For another example, see N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 354–55 (Colo. 2000), for 
another example; see also Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013); Doe v. Doe, 52 P.3d 255 
(Haw. 2002); G.D.K. v. State, 92 P.3d 834 (Wyo. 2004); Dept. of Revenue ex rel. Garcia v. Iglesias, 77 
So.3d 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); In re Paternity of B.J.H., 573 N.W.2d 99, 101–02 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1998) (best interests is a factor but is not controlling in choosing between competing presumptions of 
paternity). In contrast, Courtney v. Roggy interpreted Missouri’s statute on clashing presumptions as 
favoring the presumption based on biological paternity. 302 S.W.3d 141, 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). The 
2002 Uniform Parentage Act does not address clashing presumptions explicitly, relying instead on the 
court’s authority to use estoppel to protect a child’s relationship to a presumed father. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. background (2002).
121. The court also cited decisions from other states holding that, on the right facts, the marital 
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adopt the child.122 The effect is to give the women the status of legal par-
ents.
California cases relying on Nicholas H. and Jesusa V. were the first to 
extend the holding-out presumption to women partners of biological moth-
ers. In Elisa B. v. Superior Court, the court held that a lesbian who had 
planned for the birth of two children with her partner and who had lived as 
their mother since birth had held them out as her children and was obliged, 
as a parent, to support them when the mothers split up.123 State supreme 
courts in Kansas,124 Massachusetts,125 New Hampshire,126 and New Mexi-
co,127 and a Colorado appellate court128 subsequently held that unmarried 
women could be legal parents under the “holding-out” provision. A Nevada 
court also indicated in dicta that it would reach the same conclusion.129 The 
same outcome might have been reached had the courts adopted robust de 
facto parent rules, but that is not the route the courts took.
Functional parenthood is legally protected to a limited extent for chil-
dren born outside marriage. At least in some states, courts have discretion 
to refuse challenges to paternity findings based on lack of biological rela-
tionship, either because the challenger is estopped from bringing the chal-
lenge or to protect the child’s best interests. Further, one paternity law 
doctrine—the presumption of parentage from holding out—has been ex-
tended in a few states to same-sex couples. For the most part, however, the 
122. See Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples, 20 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 471–72 (2012) [hereinafter Harris, Voluntary Acknowledge-
ments], on second-parent adoptions for lesbian-couple-headed families. As the title of this article indi-
cates, it makes an argument for extending VAPs to same-sex couples, including a sketch of the 
constitutional argument supporting this extension. Id. at 475–88. In Partanen v. Gallagher the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court assumed that a same-sex couple could sign a VAP and so could estab-
lish the partner who was not the biological parent as a legal parent. 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1139 (Mass. 2016).
123. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005). In one companion case, K.M. v. 
E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 682 (Cal. 2005), the court held that a woman who donated her eggs to her partner—
who conceived through in vitro fertilization—was also a legal mother, and that a statute providing that a 
sperm donor is not the legal father should not apply to her. In the second companion case, Kristine H. v. 
Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 690 (Cal. 2005), the court held that a biological mother who had stipulated to a 
judgment declaring that her lesbian partner was a legal parent was estopped from challenging that 
judgment.
124. Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013). This case holds that a woman who has held 
out a child as hers may have standing to bring an action to determine parentage; the woman prevailed 
not only because of the presumption, but also because of a co-parenting agreement signed by the bio-
logical mother. Id. at 553, 557. 
125. Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2016). 
126. In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494, 501 (N.H. 2014).
127. See Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 288 (N.M. 2012). 
128. In re Parental Responsibilities of A.R.L., 318 P.3d 581, 581–82 (Colo. App. 2013).
129. St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P.3d 1027, 1032 (Nev. 2013) (holding that when one lesbian partner 
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law bases legal parentage of non-marital children on biology unless the de 
facto parent doctrine or a similar rule, discussed in Part II above, applies.
V. THE IMPACT OF OBERGEFELL, THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT
LAW, AND A PROPOSAL
The promise that Obergefell would encourage states to recognize the 
legal parenthood of both partners to same-sex marriages is bearing fruit in 
the extension of the marital presumption to same-sex married couples. In 
some states, Obergefell may be encouraging the development of legal prin-
ciples that protect functional parent-child relationships more broadly, but 
this development is very uneven. In some states, the protection for children 
raised by same-sex couples exists only if the couple is married, and in other 
states, the law does not apply equally to same-sex and opposite-sex couples 
and their children. Difficulties for same-sex families is exacerbated because 
most of the doctrines discussed in this paper require litigation to determine 
whether an adult will be recognized as a parent and the extent of that pro-
tection, since the doctrines do not provide an a priori way of establishing a 
parent-child relationship. For these reasons, new statutes to protect func-
tional parent-child relationships more fully are needed.
A. The Uneven Protection from State to State
As this paper has shown, some jurisdictions have case law and statutes 
that provide broad protection to functional families across a range of situa-
tions, including recognizing de facto parent claims or their equivalent, pro-
tecting parenthood of both same-sex partners who raise a child together, 
and limiting efforts to rebut the marital presumption or disestablish the 
paternity of unmarried fathers. Examples include California,130 Colora-
do,131 D.C.,132 Iowa,133 Massachusetts,134 Michigan,135 and New Mexico.136
In most states, however, protection, if it is available, is more limited.
130. See supra notes 120–125 and accompanying text (limitations on rebutting holding out doc-
trine); supra note 123 and accompanying text (extending holding out doctrine to same-sex couples); 
Harris, Reforming Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1311 n.105–08 and accompanying text (limits on 
rebutting marital presumption), and 1326 n.192 (limits on disestablishing paternity).
131. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-123(1)(c) (2016); In re Parental Responsibilities of A.R.L., 
318 P.3d at 581 (Colo. App. 2013) (parental status of unmarried same-sex partners); Harris, Reforming 
Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1310 n.82 (limits on rebutting marital presumption), and 1326 n.194 
(limits on disestablishing paternity).
132. D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1) (2016) (protecting functional parents and same-sex parents); M.M. 
v. T-M.M., 995 A.2d 164, 164 (D.C. 2010) (per curium) (limit on disestablishing paternity).
133. Gartner v. Iowa Dept. Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 351 (Iowa 2013) (parental status of 
married same-sex couples); Harris, Reforming Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1310 n.99 (limits on 
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For example, some cases extend protection for functional parents only 
to adults in same-sex relationships. They include recent decisions from 
Oklahoma and New York. In Ramey v. Sutton, the Oklahoma court said, 
“[t]oday we . . . acknowledge[] the rights of a non-biological parent in a 
same sex relationship who has acted in loco parentis.”137 In Brooke S.B.,
the New York Court of Appeals said that a person who is not biologically 
related to a child has standing to seek functional parent protection only 
where the person “proves by clear and convincing evidence that he or she 
has agreed with the biological parent of the child to conceive and raise the 
child as co-parents.”138 While on its face this language is gender-neutral, as 
a practical matter, it is likely to apply almost always to same-sex couples, 
since the state has a statute providing that a husband is the legal father of a 
child born to his wife by artificial insemination with his consent.139
A number of states protect functional parent-child relationships of op-
posite-sex couples, but do not signal protection for same-sex parent-child 
relationships outside marriage. These states include North Dakota,140 Del-
aware,141 and Texas.142 Some states, such as Florida143 and Illinois,144 have
134. Hunter v. Rose, 975 N.E.2d 857, 857 (Mass. 2012) (parental status of married same-sex 
couples); Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133 (Mass. 2016) (applying holding out presumption to 
lesbian couple); In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 488 (Mass. 2001) (limits on disestablishing 
paternity); Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601, 602 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (same).
135. See Stankevich v. Milliron, 882 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (married same-sex 
couples’ parentage); Harris, Reforming Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1312 n.113–16 and accompa-
nying text (limits on rebutting marital presumption), and 1322 n.168 (limits on disestablishing paterni-
ty).
136. See Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 290–91 (N.M. 2012) (discussing the parental status of 
same-sex unmarried partners); see also Harris, Reforming Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1309 n.83 
(limits on rebutting marital presumption), and 1322 n.162 (limits on disestablishing paternity).
137. 362 P.3d 217, 219 (Okla 2015). Oklahoma also limits efforts to rebut the marital presumption 
and to disestablish paternity. See also Harris, Reforming Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1309 n.85 
(limits on rebutting marital presumption), and 1322 n.164 (limits on disestablishing paternity).
138. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016).
139. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2016). An intermediate New York appellate court has 
held that the artificial insemination statute applied to the mother’s domestic partner. In re Kelly S. v. 
Farah M., 28 N.Y.S.3d 714, 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
140. Harris, Reforming Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1309 n.84 (limits on rebutting marital 
presumption), and 1322 n.163 (limits on disestablishing paternity).
141. Id. at 1309 n.82 (limits on rebutting marital presumption), and 1322 n.161 (limits on disestab-
lishing paternity)
142. Id. at 1309 n.86 (limits on rebutting marital presumption), and 1322 n.165 (limits on disestab-
lishing paternity); In re J.M.C., No. 04-06-00431-CV, 2007 WL 460691, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 
2007) (judgment based on admission of paternity without genetic testing cannot be set aside since 
mother’s alleged lie is intrinsic, not extrinsic, fraud).
143. D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 345–46 (Fla. 2013) (recognizing parental rights of both 
parties in lesbian relationship but only because one provided the egg and the other one gestated child); 
Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 61 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (refusing to recognize de facto parent 
doctrine, dicta saying marital presumption would not apply to same-sex couple because based on biolo-
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laws that strongly tend to base legal parentage on biology when the parents 
are opposite-sex, even if they are married, and that do not recognize func-
tional parenthood for same-sex parents outside marriage. Utah protects 
functional parenthood within heterosexual marriage but does not have laws 
that protect functional parenthood claims outside marriage or for same-sex 
couples.145
Finally, some cases that protect the parentage of unmarried same-sex 
couples suggest that this protection may evaporate now that these couples 
can legally marry. For example, Ramey v. Sutton, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court decision recognizing the de facto parent doctrine, says that one of the 
elements that must be proven is that the parties were legally unable to mar-
ry.146 Similarly, in 2015 the Oregon Court of Appeals reaffirmed a 2009 
decision holding that a person who consents to the artificial insemination of 
her unmarried same-sex partner must be regarded as a legal parent of the 
child.147 At the time of the 2009 opinion, same-sex couples could not marry 
or enter domestic partnerships in Oregon. The court reasoned that the 
state’s artificial insemination statute, which by its terms applies only to 
married opposite-sex couples,148 violated the state constitution by creating 
a privilege, i.e., legal parentage by operation of law, that was not granted to 
all citizens on equal terms without adequate justification.149 By 2015, when 
the second case was decided, same-sex couples could marry, and the court 
held that the statute would not apply to children born to same-sex couples 
who could but chose not to marry. It said,
If an unmarried opposite-sex couple conceives a child by artificial in-
semination using sperm from a donor, the statute does not apply, even if 
the couple, in the words that the trial court used to describe petitioner 
and respondent, “lived together as a couple, intended to remain together, 
144. In re Scarlett Z.-D, 11 N.E.3d 360, 371 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (refusing to recognize de facto 
parent doctrine); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b-5) (2013) (allowing a man who signed a VAP to seek an 
order for genetic testing) repealed by 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7 P.A. 99-85, § 977 (eff. Jan. 1, 
2016). 
145. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-607 (West 2016) (limiting rebuttal of marital presumption), and 
§ 78B-15-307 (allowing genetic evidence to set aside VAP); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 808 (Utah 
2007) (refusing to recognize de facto parent doctrine); Roe v. Patton, No. 2:15-CV-00253-DB, 2015 
WL 4476734, at *1 (D. Utah July 22, 2015) (ordering state office of vital statistics to issue birth certifi-
cate recognizing non-biological mother as parent on basis of Obergefell).
146. 362 P.3d 217, 219 (Okla. 2015).
147. In re Madrone, 350 P.3d 495 (Or. Ct. App. 2015), modifying Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 
P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
148. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2015), invalidated by Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 40.
149. Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 37–40. Shineovich also held that the constitution does not require that 
the marital presumption apply to same-sex couples because of its presumption about biological paterni-
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and intended to have a child and to co-parent the child.” Accordingly, it 
would be inappropriate for courts to extend the statute to same-sex cou-
ples solely on the basis of one or both of the parties’ intent to have the 
nonbiological party assume a parental role . . . . Just as an opposite-sex 
couple may be fully committed to their relationship and family but 
choose not to marry, a same-sex couple, given the option to marry, could 
make that same choice—commitment without marriage. Because ORS 
109.243 would not apply to an opposite-sex couple that made that 
choice, it follows that the statute also should not apply to same-sex cou-
ples that make the same choice.150
B. The Limitations of After-the-Fact Remedies
The marital presumption, the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, 
artificial insemination, and other assisted reproduction statutes can be ap-
plied to determine a child’s legal parent without litigation. However, many 
of the legal rules discussed in this paper that may be used to find that a 
functional but non-biological parent is a legal parent can be invoked only 
when the parental status of that person is challenged and litigation follows. 
The de facto parent and related rules require a court to examine in hindsight 
the relationships and actions of the legal parent and the claimed de facto 
parent to determine whether the doctrine’s elements are proven. Similarly, 
only a court can determine whether the conditions for invoking the holding-
out statute were satisfied and, if so, whether the presumption of parentage 
has been rebutted, based on the specifics of the case. And if the marital 
presumption may be rebutted or a VAP set aside because the man is not the 
biological father, litigation is again required to determine if the challenge 
should be barred because of estoppel or the child’s best interests.151
This characteristic of these rules means that they cannot provide cer-
tainty about a child’s legal parentage unless and until litigation occurs. 
Relationships remain vulnerable to disruption, and the expense and diffi-
culty of litigation almost surely deters some functional parents from mak-
ing claims that they could theoretically win.
C. Toward a Statutory Solution
To remedy the problems with existing legal avenues for protecting 
functional parent-child relationships, statutory solutions are needed.152
These statutes should create simple, inexpensive procedures for legal par-
150. In re Madrone, 350 P.3d at 501.
151. See Harris, Reforming Paternity Law, supra note 13, at 1336–38.
152. For another approach to a solution, see Katharine K. Baker, The DNA Default and Its Discon-





      03/01/2017   10:44:39
38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 50 Side A      03/01/2017   10:44:39
2017] OBERGEFELL’S LEGAL IMPACT 85
ents and their partners who are or will become functional parents, to regis-
ter the partners as legal parents, much as a VAP allows an unmarried moth-
er and a man to register his legal paternity.153 Where an adult other than the 
man may have a claim to be the child’s legal parent (assuming for purposes 
of discussion that state law permits a child to have only two parents154), the 
law should at least create a simple, inexpensive procedure for that other 
person to relinquish his or her claim, as the Uniform Parentage Act per-
mits.155
If parentage of a child is disputed, so that litigation is necessary, the 
law should clearly provide that a de facto parent is a legal parent, on an 
equal footing with other legal parents. Several states have statutory provi-
sions to this effect; the District of Columbia statutes are particularly com-
plete.156
These proposals probably would probably be rejected in states that are 
generally unfriendly to legally recognized functional parenthood or to 
same-sex families. However, in the many states that are amenable to recog-
nizing same-sex families and functional parenthood, these changes should 
be received more favorably, since they facilitate the clarification of parent-
child relationships at a time when parties are not hostile to each other. This 
would provide greater stability and certainty to families as well as reduce 
family law litigation.
153. For a more extended development of this proposal specifically for same-sex partners, see
Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments, supra note 122, at 487–88. 
154. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016).
155. Under the Uniform Parentage Act, a person can sign a document disclaiming paternity at the 
same time another man signs a VAP, and both can be filed at the same time. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§§ 301–305 (2002).
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ASSISTED REPRODUCTION INEQUALITY AND MARRIAGE 
EQUALITY
SEEMA MOHAPATRA, JD, MPH
‘“The first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the fami-
ly.”1
-Justice Kennedy, Obergefell v. Hodges.
I. INTRODUCTION
Marianne and Erin Krupa, a married lesbian couple, have been trying 
to have a baby via in vitro fertilization for three years.2 Between the two of 
them, they have suffered six miscarriages.3 They have spent over $50,000 
on infertility treatments.4 Although New Jersey is one of fifteen states that 
requires health insurance companies to offer or cover infertility coverage, 
the Krupas do not meet New Jersey’s definition of infertility.5 The Krupas, 
along with another lesbian couple, have brought suit against the New Jer-
sey Department of Banking and Insurance, based on the claim that the in-
surance mandate discriminates against their sexual orientation.6 This 
Article considers this timely case study in light of the much-heralded 
Obergefell v. Hodges decision and the Affordable Care Act’s nondiscrimi-
Associate Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, Northwestern 
University School of Law, JD, Yale University, MPH. Thank you to Dean Leticia Diaz for supporting 
this research with a summer grant. I am grateful to Megan Fuller, Abraham Elmazahi, and Kati Haupt 
for their wonderful research assistance.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (quoting CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 57 (W. 
Miller transl. 1913)).
2. Megan Jula, 4 Lesbians Sue Over New Jersey Rules on Fertility Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
8, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/nyregion/lesbian-couple-sues-over-new-jersey-rules-for-
fertility-treatment.html.
3. Lesbian Couple Sues New Jersey Over Infertility Treatment Law, CBS NEWS, (Aug. 29, 2016, 
6:51 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lesbian-couple-sues-new-jersey-over-infertility-treatment-
law/.
4. Jula, supra note 2.
5. N.J. STAT. ANN., §17B:27–46.1x (West 2016). New Jersey law’s definition of infertility only 
anticipates opposite-sex couples. In New Jersey’s statute infertility “means the disease or condition that 
results in the abnormal function of the reproductive system such that a person is not able to: impregnate 
another person; conceive after two years of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is under thirty-
five years of age, or one year of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is thirty-five years of age 
or older or one of the partners is considered medically sterile; or carry a pregnancy to live birth.” Id.
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nation protections. In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy declared that “marriage 
is fundamental under the Constitution” and should “apply with equal force 
to same-sex couples.”7 This article examines how the advent of marriage 
equality may impact the rights of same-sex couples to have biological chil-
dren via assisted reproduction and surrogacy. Specifically, this article 
points out the ways that the Obergefell decision affects the law of infertili-
ty. By the law of infertility, I mean the laws that require insurance coverage 
of infertility treatments and other assisted reproductive technologies 
(“ART”). Because same-sex couples are not able to have biological chil-
dren with each other without ART, they are functionally infertile. However, 
insurance companies and state statutes use a medical definition of infertili-
ty. I suggest that this conception must change in order for same-sex couples 
to enjoy the same ART benefits that heterosexual couples enjoy.
Part II of this Article examines the Obergefell decision as a backdrop 
for the impetus for legal change in the realm of increased access to ART. 
Part III paints a landscape of how infertility treatment is provided in the 
United States, and the potential roadblocks for same-sex couples. In this 
section, I discuss access to infertility and ART services for same-sex cou-
ples. Part IV provides an overview of the opportunities and challenges for 
biological parenthood via surrogacy for same-sex couples.8 Part V suggests 
reform efforts that may be needed for the law to be updated to accommo-
date for same-sex access to these services. Part V also suggests that equali-
ty may not be enough, as ART access in the United States is often more a 
matter of one’s bank account than their sexual orientation. I suggest efforts 
for activism in this realm to open up ART beyond its typically white, up-
per-middle-class patrons to all those who wish to have a biological child.
II. OBERGEFELL AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INCREASED ART
ACCEPTANCE
Although scholars and activists have long noted the lack of access to 
assisted reproduction in gay and lesbian couples,9 Obergefell v. Hodges and
7. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.
8. This article will focus on ART services such as IVF and surrogacy. In a few years, it may be 
possible for LGBT individuals to have uterine transplants. This may be most appealing to a trans-
woman who wishes to carry a pregnancy. At this current time, uterine transplantation is experimental. 
However, the state of technology is so rapid, and that this may actually be a possibility as a potential of 
biological parenthood. See Kavita Shah Arora & Valarie Blake, Uterus Transplantation: Ethical and 
Regulatory Challenges, J. MED. ETHICS 396, 396 (2013). 
9. John Robertson has been one of the earliest and most renown scholars advocating for procrea-
tive liberty for LGBTQ couples. See John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproduc-
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the ACA’s nondiscrimination provision provide an impetus for legal 
equality. ART is “an important tool for leveling the procreative playing 
field for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals (“LGBT”) who 
seek to procreate in familial units that do not have the potential for coital 
reproduction.”10 Professor Kimberly Mutcherson rightly notes that ART 
allows LGBT individuals to build biologically-related families.11 Equal 
access to ART can be culled from Obergefell v. Hodges’ focus on the 
parenthood rights of LGBT individuals.
A. Obergefell v. Hodges and ART Access for LGBT Couples
In justifying the decision to grant marriage rights to gay couples, Jus-
tice Kennedy, in the majority opinion in Obergefell, notes that the right to 
marry “safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from 
related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”12 Kennedy also 
states that marriage affords “the permanency and stability important to 
children’s best interests.”13 Kennedy specifically acknowledges that “many 
same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, 
whether biological or adopted.”14 These excerpts demonstrate the Supreme 
Court’s contemplation of same-sex couples participating in all the same 
activities and institutions as opposite-sex couples, principally childrearing.
By mentioning biological parenthood in the context of marriage equal-
ity, the Supreme Court accepts that same-sex couples can and do have bio-
logically related children via ART. Thus, the Obergefell decision
acknowledges the reality of gay parenthood, including gay “biological”
parenthood, and dispels false stereotypes about gay parents as somehow 
deviant.15 Although Obergefell does not create a right to biological 
parenthood, Justice Kennedy mentions the right of gay and lesbian couples 
to “marry, establish a home and bring up children.”16 For many people, the 
right to marry is incomplete without the right to have children.17 An esti-
mated 30% of married same-sex couples have children, and are raising 
10. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Procreative Pluralism, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 22, 41 
(2015).
11. Id.
12. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
13. Id. at 2600.
14. Id.
15. Courtney Megan Cahill, Obergefell and the “New” Reproduction, 100 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 1, 6 (2016).
16. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
17. Evie Jeang, Reviewing the Legal Issues that Affect Surrogacy for Same-Sex Couples, L.A.





      03/01/2017   10:44:39
38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 52 Side B      03/01/2017   10:44:39
4 MOHAPATRA MACRO (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2017 7:19 PM
90 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:1
nearly 200,000 children.18 Many married same-sex couples turn to surroga-
cy or adoption to grow their families.19 Although some fear that marriage 
equality will not mean equality in parenthood,20 optimistically the Oberge-
fell decision may lead to broader acceptance of assisted reproduction, such 
as surrogacy.21
Professor Courtney Cahill notes Obergefell suggests that procreation 
is a constitutionally protected liberty right by acknowledging the intercon-
nectedness of marriage and procreation by calling them “related rights” that 
compose a “unified whole.”22 Obergefell may bring constitutional parity 
between sexual and assisted reproduction.23 Professor Douglas NeJaime 
deems family-based LGBT equality as “particularly significant to the status 
of assisted reproduction, which is central to same-sex family formation.”24
He suggests that marriage equality has the potential to normalize numerous 
types of ART for all families, including surrogacy.25
I agree with the scholars who suggest that the Obergefell ruling “ex-
tends constitutional shelter to choices concerning. . .family relationships, 
procreation, and childrearing.”26 It also establishes a constitutional norm of 
sexual orientation equality in marriage as the “related rights” of childrear-
ing and procreation.27 Obergefell now leads to the notion that parenthood 
should accommodate same-sex couples.28 This article argues that, with this 
backdrop of marriage equality, there is a push towards assisted reproduc-
tion equality. Couples like the Krupas are desperate to have children who 
are biologically related to them.29 Their state recognizes their marriage, but 
there is a question about whether it affords them the same opportunity for 
ART as it does to opposite-sex infertile couples.
18. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption Post-Obergefell, 84 
UMKC L. REV. 663, 663 (2016).
19. Jeang, supra note 17, at 12.
20. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 18, at 663.
21. Id.
22. Cahill, supra note 16.
23. Id. at 8–10.
24. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185,
1252–1253 (2016).
25. Id.
26. Cahill, supra note 15.
27. Id.
28. NeJaime, supra note 24, at 1190. 
29. I have written elsewhere about how different forms of ART have made biological parenthood 
the normative ideal at the expense of adoption, whether justified or not. See Seema Mohapatra, Fertility 
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III. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION FOR ALL?
ART services are costly, and as a result—unless one has access to in-
surance coverage—primarily the wealthy have access to this avenue of 
reproduction.30 Part III provides an overview of how assisted reproduction 
is provided in the United States and the potential roadblocks for same-sex 
couples. In this section, I discuss access to ART for same-sex couples.
A. Access to ART Services
In light of the increased acceptance of gay and lesbian parenthood, 
there should be an effort to be more equitable for such couples in terms of 
access to biological parenthood. I am not making a value statement here 
about the preference of biological parenthood over other types of 
parenthood, such as adoption. Instead, out of fairness, LGBT couples, such 
as the Krupas discussed above, should have the same access to ART as 
their heterosexual counterparts.
Medical infertility is quite common. According to data from the Cen-
ters for Disease Control, 12% of women who are of reproductive age are 
infertile and 7.5% of all sexually experienced men younger than age 45 
reported seeing a fertility doctor during their lifetime.31 Many health insur-
ance companies do not view having a child as medically necessary, and 
thus do not cover infertility treatment. Instead, it is considered an elective 
procedure.32 Many hoped that the Affordable Care Act would add infertili-
ty treatment to its essential health benefits.33 Access to ART is linked to 
household income, marital status, education level, race, ethnicity, and 
age.34 “A dichotomy exists between the ‘haves,’ those with the financial 
means to undergo infertility treatment, and the ‘have-nots,’ those who lack 
such means.”35
30. Anne Fidler & Judith Bernstein, Infertility: From a Personal Public Health, 114 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 494, 497 (1999).
31. Kimberly Leonard, Who Has the Right to Build a Family? The Focus on LGBT Rights Could 





34. Marissa A. Mastroianni, Bridging the Gap Between the “Have” and the “Have-Nots”: The 
ACA Prohibits Insurance Coverage Discrimination Based Upon Infertility Status, 79 ALB. L. REV. 151,
151 (2016); Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 41, 49–50 (2009).





      03/01/2017   10:44:39
38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 53 Side B      03/01/2017   10:44:39
4 MOHAPATRA MACRO (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2017 7:19 PM
92 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:1
The lack of coverage has forced many couples to go into debt or mort-
gage their homes in order to access ART. “Among employers with 500 or 
more workers, last year only 54% covered an evaluation provided by a 
specialist, 32% covered drug therapy and 24% covered in vitro fertilization, 
according to Mercer consulting group.”36 This is a decrease since 2013 
when coverage reached its peak.
ART can be very expensive, and even when covered, unlimited cycles 
are not covered.37 In fact, there is only about a 25%–30% success rate for 
IVF.38 Therefore, multiple cycles are often performed. Costs could range 
for up to $3,000 per cycle for hormone therapy to between $10,000 and 
$15,000 per cycle for ART that involves tubal surgery.39 On average, one 
IVF cycle in the United States can cost between $10,000 and $15,000 with 
only a 25–30% live birth success rate.40 Therefore, many couples will need 
to undergo several IVF cycles to achieve their desired outcome. The cost to 
conceive a child through IVF ranged from $44,000 to $211,940 in 1992 
dollars.41 Thus, ART services are usually utilized for the wealthy that can 
afford to pay out of pocket for the services. However, access to insurance 
does increase access to ART. One study noted in states requiring that insur-
ance cover IVF, the rate of utilization was 277% of the rate when there was 
no coverage.42 Thus, insurance coverage of ART allows greater access to 
it.43 It follows that in the states that require insurance companies to offer or 
cover ART, we should ensure that gay and lesbian couples have the same 
access as straight couples.44
36. Leonard, supra note 31.
37. Barton H. Hamilton & Brian McManus, The Effects of Insurance Mandates on Choices and 
Outcomes in Infertility Treatment Markets, 21 HEALTH ECON. 994, 994–95 (2012).
38. Id. at 994.
39. Mastroianni, supra note 34, at 158.
40. Id. at 157–58.
41. Marianne P. Bitler & Lucie Schmidt, Utilization of Infertility Treatments: the Effects of 
Insurance Mandates, 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17668, 2011), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17668.pdf.
42. Tarun Jain et al., Insurance Coverage and Outcomes of In Vitro Fertilization, 347 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 661, 664–65 (2002).
43. Hamilton & McManus, supra note 37, at 1009.
44. Of course, there is the risk that these states may stop offering ART coverage if the population 
who is eligible to utilize ART increases. Because there is no requirement that ART is covered under the 
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B. Insurance Coverage of Infertility Services
Currently, fifteen states require insurers in their state to either offer or 
cover ART services.45 However, according to the American Society of 
Reproductive Medicine, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Rhode Island are the only ones that man-
date coverage; the rest require only that insurers offer plans that include it, 
a loophole that leaves it up to employers to decide whether to offer those 
plans to their employees.46 Of the fifteen states, two of them—California 
and Texas—only require an insurer to let employers know that coverage is 
available.47 They do not require insurers to cover or employers to actually 
purchase such policies. In the public sector, the Department of Defense 
covers in vitro fertilization for active duty members, but the Department of 
Veterans Affairs bans it even for former service members who sustained 
injuries during battle that rendered them infertile.48 Further, states do not 
offer such coverage to low-income people in their Medicaid programs. 
Advocates of expanding access maintain that it is unfair to same-sex cou-
ples to force them to biologically demonstrate infertility, and it is critical 
that we deliver family building under insurance contracts to people who 
need different things.49
Because these are state by state issues, these laws are often incon-
sistent in terms of what type of infertility services are covered, whether 
marital status is an issue, and whether there is a maximum age of cover-
age.50 Of these states, only Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, and West Virginia actually require insurers to 
cover IVF.51
45. State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (June 1, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/insurance-coverage-for-
infertility-laws.aspx; See also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-85-137, 23-86-118 (West 2016); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2016); CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6 (West 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
38a-536 (West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. §431:10A-116.5(a) (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., INS. §15-
810 (West 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (West 2016), 176A § 8K (West 2016), 176B 
§ 4J (West 2016), 176G § 4 (West 2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-102 (West 2016); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17B:27-46.1x (West 2016); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3221(k)(6), 4303(s) (McKinney 2016); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.01 (West 2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-30, 27-19-23, 27-20-20, 27-41-33
(West 2016); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1366.005 (West 2016); W. VA. CODE §33-25A-2 (West 2016).
46. Leonard, supra note 31.
47. Jillian Casey et al., Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 83, 113 
(2016).
48. Leonard, supra note 31.
49. Id.
50. Mohapatra, Fertility Preservation, supra note 29, at 206. 
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Many of these state statutes do not actually define infertility. In those 
that do—California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
York, and Rhode Island—all of the definitions include the inability to con-
ceive after a year or more of sexual relations.52 This does not apply in 
terms of same-sex couples, because they cannot conceive without ART. 
Some states’ definitions include requirements that the individual be mar-
ried, and the Obergefell decision at least allows same-sex married couples 
to fit into this category now. Additionally, some states require specific 
diagnosis by a physician of a condition as the cause of the infertility.53 In
each of these scenarios, gay and lesbian couples would have a more diffi-
cult time proving infertility than heterosexual couples. Thus, even in those 
few states where insurance companies have to cover ART, the definitions 
of infertility often anticipate medical infertility—not infertility due to being 
in a same-sex relationship. Arguably, this inequity discriminates against 
same-sex couples.
C. The ACA and Nondiscrimination
This is a problem because the Affordable Care Act requires nondis-
crimination in the provision of health care services.54 Under the ACA, dis-
crimination exists if insurers differentiate among individuals in designing 
and implementing private health insurance coverage.55 Of course, the ACA 
does not actually require ART coverage.56 The ACA’s statutory language 
does not mention infertility treatment coverage or its effect upon the fifteen 
states that have enacted state insurance mandates.57 Additionally, the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) has not included infer-
tility coverage as an essential health benefit in any subsequent regulation.58
Each state has the authority to create its own essential benefits under the 
ACA. DHHS gave states the authority to create their own essential health 
52. Id. For example, Massachusetts law defines infertility as “the condition of an individual who 
is unable to conceive or produce conception during a period of one year if the female is age 35 or 
younger or during a period of six months if the female is over the age of 35.” 211 MASS. CODE REGS.
37.03 (LexisNexis 2016).
53. Id. Mohapatra, Fertility Preservation, supra note 29, at 207.
54. 45 C.F.R. § 156.125(b) (2016); 45 C.F.R. § 156.200(e) (2016).
55. Mastroianni, supra note 34, at 176–77.
56. See Kenan Omurtag & G. David Adamson, The Affordable Care Act’s Impact on Fertility 
Care, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 654 (2013) (minimum insurance coverage required under 
the ACA does not cover infertility services).
57. Paul R. Brezina et al., How Obamacare Will Impact Reproductive Health, 31 SEMINARS 
REPROD. MED. 189, 194 (2013).
58. Kate Devine et al., The Affordable Care Act: Early Implications for Fertility Medicine,
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benefit standards based upon typical insurance coverage plans within the 
state.59 Therefore, the states with insurance mandates regarding infertility 
treatments have adopted essential benefit standards that incorporated such 
laws.60 Thus, this is seen by many as a lost opportunity. Instead of increas-
ing access to ART, the ACA just maintained the same level of access that 
existed prior to the ACA. That said, even if infertility was covered, it 
would not necessarily apply to gay or lesbian couples without an explicit 
statement to that effect. Health insurance covers medical ailments, and 
insurers could continue to define infertility in ways that do not apply to 
LGBT individuals.
Even well-meaning efforts to even the playing field in states such as a 
California and Maryland do not completely solve the problem of ART in-
equity.
The Krupas are making the argument that, as a same-sex couple, they 
are requesting the same access to ART services as heterosexual couples 
receive.61 This example highlights the ways that a gay married couple may 
be treated differently than a heterosexual married couple under state insur-
ance laws. Two states recently made amendments to their insurance laws to 
prevent discrimination; California defines infertility as “either (1) the pres-
ence of a demonstrated condition recognized by a licensed physician and 
surgeon as a cause of infertility, or (2) the inability to conceive a pregnancy 
or to carry a pregnancy to a live birth after a year or more of regular sexual 
relations without contraception.”62 In order to be clear that infertility cov-
erage must be provided to same-sex couples, California amended this law 
to include an antidiscrimination provision. It states that coverage for the 
treatment of infertility
shall be offered and, if purchased, provided without discrimination on 
the basis of age, ancestry, color, disability, domestic partner status, gen-
der, gender expression, gender identity, genetic information, marital sta-
tus, national origin, race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation. Nothing in 
this subdivision shall be construed to interfere with the clinical judgment 
of a physician and surgeon.63
59. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. AND INS. OVERSIGHT, Essential Health Benefits: List of The 
Largest Three Small Group Products by State 3 (2015),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/largest-smgroup-
products-4-8-15-508d-pdf-Adobe-Acrobat-Pro.pdf.; see generally 45 C.F.R. § 156.100 (2015) (granting 
States the ability to select their own benchmark plan).
60. Mastroianni, supra note 34, at 153–54.
61. Lesbians Challenge New Jersey’s Infertility Definition, 26 WESTLAW J. INS. COVERAGE
(2016) (citing Krupa et al. v. Badolato, No. 16-cv-4637 2016 WL 4250861, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 1, 
2016)).
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Although this is a well-meaning change, it still appears that a licensed 
physician must recognize that being part of a same-sex couple is the “con-
dition” that is the cause of the infertility. It would have been far more ex-
plicit to add a provision noting that same-sex couples are, by definition, per 
se infertile and would thus have access to infertility coverage.
Like California, Maryland amended its state law requiring ART and 
IVF coverage to accommodate same-sex lesbian couples.64 The Maryland 
provision is more explicit than California’s. It specifies that “insurers, non-
profit health service plans, and health maintenance organizations [are pre-
vented] from requiring specified conditions of coverage for specified 
infertility benefits for a patient who is married to an individual of the same-
sex.”65
D. Definitions of Infertility in Private Insurance Contracts
It is not just a matter of state insurance coverage mandates where there 
is an equality concern. Private insurers also have definitions of infertility 
that do not allow lesbian or gay couples to gain access to ART Services.
For example, Jill Soller-Mihlek sued UnitedHealthcare because she could 
not meet its definition of infertility because she was a lesbian.66 Her Unit-
edHealthcare insurance policy defined infertility as an “inability to achieve 
pregnancy after 12 months of unprotected heterosexual intercourse.”67 The
policy actually tacitly acknowledged lesbian couples and deemed that they 
must use sperm donors, and must pay for expensive donor insemination for 
12 months before they meet the definition of infertility.68 UnitedHealthcare 
stated that its policy was based on ASRM’s clinical disease definition of 
infertility.69 It does not seem fair to use the clinical definition of infertility 
in the case of same-sex couples. Julien Murphy uses the term “relational
infertility” to describe lesbian relationships “because there is no biological 
64. Eli Y. Adashi, JAMA Forum: A Same-Sex Infertility Health Insurance Mandate in Mary-
land?, NEWS AT JAMA (May 20, 2015), https://newsatjama.jama.com/2015/05/20/jama-forum-a-same-
sex-infertility-health-insurance-mandate-in-maryland/.
65. Id. At the same time, it also amended its outdated statute to ensure that male medical infertili-
ty was acknowledged. MD. CODE ANN., INS. §15-810 (West 2016).
66. Stephanie Fairyington, Should Same-Sex Couples Receive Fertility Benefits?, N.Y. TIMES,
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way for two women to conceive together without the advantage of medical 
intervention.”70
The Krupa case is a narrow one. It involves a lesbian couple who ac-
tually is medically infertile. They are correct in their assertion that they are 
being treated differently from other infertile individuals because the defini-
tion of infertility in New Jersey does not include women like them—
women in lesbian relationships who are medically infertile.71 It is important 
to change the language in state insurance statutes to ensure that medically 
infertile individuals receive access to ART regardless of sexual preference. 
The language of the statute should be amended the way Maryland’s was—
and all states requiring ART coverage should ensure that they remove lan-
guage that differentiates based on sexual orientation.
This change, however, still does not go far enough in putting LGBT 
couples on equal footing with heterosexual couples. The reality remains 
that access to ART will remain mostly out of pocket. This does harm gay 
couples because it is impossible for them to reproduce “naturally.” With 
the acceptance of gay marriage, there will be great acceptance of biological 
parenthood for gay couples, via ART and surrogacy. It would be ideal if the 
grassroots efforts that got the marriage equality effort success would coa-
lesce around the effort to have greater access to ART for all people.
IV. ACCESS TO SURROGACY SERVICES FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
I have written extensively about surrogacy, both domestic and interna-
tionally.72 In this short Part IV, I aim to provide a snapshot of what access 
to surrogacy looks like for a gay married couple in the United States. Cur-
rently, gay couples wishing to have a biological child must use a surrogate, 
since neither male partner can carry a child.73 Commercial gestational sur-
70. Julien S. Murphy, Should Lesbians Count as Infertile Couples?: Antilesbian Discrimination 
in Assisted Reproduction, in EMBODYING BIOETHICS: RECENT FEMINIST ADVANCES (NEW FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES) 103, 111–12 (Anne Donchin & Laura M. Purdy, eds., 1999).
71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-46.1x(a) (West 2016).
72. See generally Seema Mohapatra, Achieving Reproductive Justice in the International Surro-
gacy Market, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 191 (2012); Seema Mohapatra, Stateless Ba-
bies & Adoption Scams: A Bioethical Analysis of International Commercial Surrogacy, 30 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 412, (2012); Seema Mohapatra, Achieving Reproductive Justice in the International Surroga-
cy Market, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 191 (2012); Seema Mohapatra, A Race to the Bottom? The Need for 
International Regulation of the Rapidly Growing Global Surrogacy Market?, in GESTATIONAL 
SURROGACY AND THE WOMB FOR RENT INDUSTRY IN INDIA (Sayantani DasGupta & Shamita Das 
Dasgupta eds., 2013).
73. Lauren B. Paulk, Embryonic Personhood: Implications for Assisted Reproductive Technology 
in International Human Rights Law, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 781, 788 (2014). In the 
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rogacy is the most common method of surrogacy.74 In such arrangements, 
there is a contractual relationship between the surrogate and the intended 
parents, where the surrogate is paid to carry the child with whom she has 
no genetic relationship.75 A gay couple can use a donor egg and sperm 
from one of the partners outside the body to form an embryo via IVF which 
will then be implanted into the non-genetically related surrogate.76
Although surrogacy arrangements can cost up to $100,000 in the Unit-
ed States, the cost has risen 89% from 2004 to 2008.77 Surrogacy laws vary 
widely from state-to-state.78 Some states outright ban surrogacy and crimi-
nalize those entering into agreements.79 Others view surrogacy as a form of 
adoption, rather than allowing the intended parents to be on the birth certif-
icate immediately.80 New Hampshire and Maine had passed comprehensive 
surrogacy legislation even before Obergefell, and their laws made no dis-
tinction between same-sex and heterosexual couples. Some commentators 
have noted that “married same-sex couples building families through gesta-
tional surrogacy can now obtain a parentage order and have both parents’
names on the birth certificate in 32 green-light states.”81 Although this is a 
majority of U.S. states, there is a long way to go to have true parity be-
tween same-sex and heterosexual couples.
Surrogacy statutes in some states specifically only apply to married 
couples.82 Post-Obergefell, some claim that these states ignore the statutes’
language referring to the infertility of the intended mother.83 However, this 
is not real assurance that surrogacy is allowed.
There are only nine surrogacy-friendly states in the United States for 
gay married couples.84 These are California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
74. Seema Mohapatra, Adopting an International Convention on Surrogacy–A Lesson from 
Intercountry Adoption, 13 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 25, 32 (2015). 
75. Id.
76. Paulk, supra note 73, at 788.
77. Evie Jeang, Reviewing the Legal Issues that Affect Surrogacy for Same-Sex Couples, L.A.




81. Diane S. Hinson, Parentage Rights for Same-Sex Couples: State-by-State Gestational Surro-
gacy Laws, 38 SPG FAM. ADVOC. 42, 43–45 (2016) (green-light states are states where surrogacy is 
permitted, pre-birth orders are granted throughout the state, and both parents will be named on the birth 
certificate).
82. Seema Mohapatra, States of Confusion: Regulation of Surrogacy in the United 
States, in COMMODIFICATION OF THE HUMAN BODY: A CANNIBAL MARKET (J.D. Rainhorn & S. El 
Boudamoussi eds., 2015).
83. Diane S. Hinson, Ask The Expert, 38 SPG FAM. ADVOC. 42, 42 (2016). 
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Maine, New Hampshire, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Texas.85 In
these states, surrogacy is permitted, and pre-birth orders are granted 
throughout the state.86 Additionally, in these states, both same-sex parents 
will be named on the birth certificate.87 There are twenty-three states where 
surrogacy is permitted but where it is not clear that pre-birth orders are 
allowed.88 There are nineteen “hostile jurisdictions” to surrogacy generally, 
with Mississippi specifically discriminating against the sexual orientation 
of the intended parents.89 Michigan law not only prohibits surrogacy con-
tracts, but criminalizes attempts at making such contracts.90
For gay couples who wish to seek biological parenthood, their only 
current option is surrogacy. Similarly, if neither woman in a lesbian couple 
can successfully carry a child, surrogacy may be an option for them. Citi-
zens living in one of the many states where commercial surrogacy is not 
available will have to travel to a more surrogacy-friendly state for such an 
arrangement. This is not only inconvenient, but also expensive. Surrogacy 
is really only available to those gay and lesbian couples who are upper 
class. This means that poorer and middle-class gay and lesbian couples will 
either have to seek the uncertain and inconvenient prospect of international 
surrogacy, or not be a parent to a biological child at all.
A. Surrogacy Acceptance Post-Obergefell
Many expect the law of surrogacy to continue to become more open 
post-Obergefell. In New York, an openly gay state senator—who along 
with his partner had a baby via surrogacy in California—unsuccessfully 
attempted to lift New York State’s commercial-surrogacy ban.91 The bill 
would have allowed “compensated gestational surrogacy and would have 
furnished mechanisms by which ‘intended parents’ could secure parentage 
judgments.”92 Additionally, intended parents could include same-sex 
visited Sept. 4, 2016) (Creative Family Solutions, LLC is a surrogacy law firm that publishes an online 
“surrogacy map” which uses color coding to visually demonstrate the relative stance towards surrogacy 




88. Id. (these include Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Mexi-
co, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and West Virginia). 
89. Hinson, Ask The Expert, supra note 84, at 45. 
90. Connor Cory, Access and Exploitation: Can Gay Men and Feminists Agree on Surrogacy 
Policy?, 23 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 133, 143–44 (2015).
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spouses, unmarried intimate partners, and single individuals.93 Professor
Douglas NeJaime notes that, had this effort passed, male same-sex couples, 
single parents, and heterosexual couples who also engage in assisted repro-
duction, including surrogacy, “would have benefited from wider availabil-
ity and recognition.94 Although this bill did not pass, we can expect similar 
efforts to continue in New York and other states that do not recognize ges-
tational surrogacy.
B. International vs. Domestic Surrogacy
Gay married couples in the United States often prefer entering into a 
surrogacy arrangement within the United States because many foreign 
countries still prohibit same-sex marriage.95 Therefore, same-sex couples 
must pay a higher price for the same arrangement that would cost less than 
half of the price abroad.96 I have argued elsewhere that the hodgepodge of 
surrogacy laws in the United States poses a real problem for potential in-
tended parents.97 In light of changes occurring post-Obergefell, it may not 
be long before a federal surrogacy law is enacted. The issue of cost is an 
issue that still must be addressed. Can we see a future where one can pur-
chase literal fertility insurance, including access to surrogacy or a surroga-
cy employment benefit? We are not at that point right now, but with the 
growing acceptance of surrogacy, this may be coming.
V. “INFERTILITY” EQUALITY
With the overview provided thus far about the push towards ART 
equality for same-sex couples, this section revisits the Krupa case to con-
sider what legal changes would ensure equality. New Jersey’s statute man-
dates that insurance plans operating in the state cover medically necessary 
expenses incurred in the diagnosis and treatment of infertility.98 New Jer-
sey’s insurance mandate defines infertility to include a
disease or condition that results in the abnormal function of the repro-
ductive system such that a person is not able to . . . conceive after two 
years of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is under 35 years of 
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Jeang, supra note 17, at 12.
96. Id.
97. Mohapatra, States of Confusion, supra note 83.
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age, or one year of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is 35 
years of age or older.99
The Krupas’ complaint—filed in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey—says the requirement denies lesbians due process and 
equal protection under the law “by mandating that the infertility care of 
heterosexual women be covered by their insurance carriers but failing to 
mandate that the same infertility care be covered for women in same-sex 
relationships.”100 The Krupas claim that relief from the mandate definition 
is necessary because, given the high cost of infertility, women in same-sex 
relationships have to “choose between starting a family and their financial 
security.”101
Compared with opposite-sex couples, a lesbian couple would have to 
pay for one to two years of artificial insemination out-of-pocket before it 
qualifies as medically “infertile.” Additionally, because the statute requires 
that the inability to conceive after the period of unprotected intercourse be 
caused by a disease or condition that results in the abnormal function of the 
reproductive system, it is not clear that a gay couple could actually qualify 
as infertile.102 New Jersey mandates insurance coverage for infertility 
treatments; however, wording in its law asks couples to demonstrate they 
have tried to conceive naturally by having unprotected sex for a year or 
two, depending on their age.103 The Krupas have argued that the language is 
discriminatory, as unprotected sex does not lead naturally to conception for 
same-sex couples.104
It does not make sense for insurance companies to only cover so-
called medical infertility. Just as lesbian couples cannot have a baby with-
out ART, nor can medically infertile persons. Professor John Robertson 
points out that if one rejects the argument that infertile individuals should 
not be helped because “nature has not equipped people to reproduce,” the 
same logic causes us the reject the exceptionalism for LGBT individuals.105
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”) defines 
infertility as “a disease, defined by the failure to achieve a successful preg-
nancy after 12 months or more of appropriate, timed unprotected inter-
99. Lesbians Challenge New Jersey’s Infertility Definition, supra note 61.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Valarie Blake, It’s an Art Not A Science: State-Mandated Insurance Coverage of Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies and Legal Implications for Gay and Unmarried Persons, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 651, 667 (2011).
103. Leonard, supra note 31.
104. Id.
105. John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE 
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course or therapeutic donor insemination.”106 Even the World Health Or-
ganization (“WHO”), defines infertility as “a disease of the reproductive 
system defined by the failure to achieve a clinical pregnancy after 12 
months or more of regular unprotected sexual intercourse.”107
Many insurance companies use the ASRM’s definition.108 The ASRM 
and the WHO, the international public health advisory group, should con-
sider adding a statement that same-sex couples are deemed per se infertile 
as they cannot produce a child without ART. This would ensure clarity and 
access and comport with ASRM other public statements about the rights of 
LGBT individuals to access ART.109
VI. CONCLUSION
The scientific advances of assisted reproduction, and the public em-
brace of it, have made the use of in vitro fertilization relatively common-
place in the United States today. Gone are the days of Louisa Brown being 
labeled as a “test tube baby.” In many social circles (often white, and upper 
middle class), the use of IVF is not unusual, even when one lives in one of 
the thirty-five states that do not have required insurance coverage of infer-
tility services.110
Access to biological parenthood for LGBT individuals is a matter of 
reproductive justice. Reproductive justice occurs “when [all people] have 
the economic, social and political power and resources to make healthy 
decisions about our bodies, sexuality and reproduction for ourselves, our 
families and our communities.”111 The reality is that access is assisted re-
production in the United States is enjoyed by the privileged few, with many 
medically infertile not seeking ART due to the high costs of such treat-
ment.112 With compelling stories like the Krupas, LGBT groups should 
106. Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Definitions of 




107. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Infertility Definitions and Terminology,
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/infertility/definitions/en/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2016).
108. For example, in the earlier example of UnitedHealth, the definition in the policy was based on 
the ASRM definition. Fairyington, supra note 66.
109. See Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 107.
110. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 938 (1996)
(“Most couples who use IVF services are white, highly educated, and affluent.”).
111. See Asian Communities for Reprod. Just., A New Vision for Advancing our Movement for 
Reproductive Health, Reproductive Rights, and Reproductive Justice 1, 2 (2005), 
http://forwardtogether.org/assets/docs/ACRJ-A-New-Vision.pdf.
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band together with infertility advocates such as RESOLVE to build a coali-
tion to increase access and decrease cost of ART. This Article began by 
describing how the Obergefell decision emphasized parenthood by LGBT 
couples and how some couples are now demanding equal rights in ART. 
Then, I highlighted state differences in coverage for ART and varying state 
legal stances on surrogacy. This shows how difficult it is for a LGBT cou-
ple to navigate their eligibility for ART or surrogacy services. Of course, as 
I noted, the biggest determination of who accesses ART is the size of one’s
bank account. I have outlined some suggestions about how to increase ac-
cess to ART for LGBT couples by changing definitions to allow LGBT 
couples to have the same privileges as heterosexual couples. However, this 
is not enough. ART coverage in the United States is still far too limited. It 
is not true equity when only the rich can access these services. All insur-
ance companies should have to cover ART services. I realize that this is a 
tough sell, when insurance coverage in general with the ACA is such a 
political hot button issue. However, the road to marriage equality was 
tough and full of early setbacks.113 With the dogged determination of 
LGBT community groups, marriage equity was achieved.
If there is a desire for ART equity, LGBT activists could similar push 
for increased, not just equal, coverage. Insurance coverage greatly increas-
es who will actually have a chance to be a biological parent, if they are 
medically infertile (such as someone that has a biological cause for infer-
tility) or per se infertile (such as in the case of an LGBT individual). One 
way to increase access to ART is to push for lower costs for ART. This
would allow a more diverse group of people to use it. The Economist re-
cently published a story entitled “An Arm and a Leg for a Fertilised Egg,”
which outlines current efforts to make IVF cheaper.114 Cheaper IVF would 
reduce the cost of surrogacy, so it would help same-sex couples of both 
genders, as well as heterosexual couples.
It is important to recognize that all individuals, whether LGBT or not, 
should have access to biological parenthood, not just the ones who can 
afford it.115 Blacks access ART at levels much lower than whites, although 
113. Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional Inevitability of Same-Sex Marriage, 71 
MD. L. REV. 471, 472 (2012).
114. An Arm and a Leg for a Fertilised Egg, ECONOMIST (Aug. 27, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21705676-doctors-have-spent-decades-trying-make-ivf-
more-effective-now-they-are-trying-make-it.
115. Laura Nixon, The Right to (Trans) Parent: A Reproductive Justice Approach to Reproductive 
Rights, Fertility, and Family-Building Issues Facing Transgender People, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
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they face higher rates of infertility.116 Being Black117 and gay or lesbian is a 
double whammy, and makes one even more vulnerable in society.118 We
need to be sensitive that there is no true ART equality if ART is mainly 
accessed by wealthy white LGBT couples.
This article suggests that access to ART should be equivalent regard-
less of your sexual orientation. However, I acknowledge that this does not 
go far enough. The legal landscape for coverage of ART and surrogacy 
services is bleak in many states. For example, if the Krupas were unsuc-
cessful with IVF and wished to use the services of a surrogate, they would 
not be able to do so in New Jersey. New Jersey bans surrogacy arrange-
ments for all, regardless of sexual orientation, after their much maligned 
Baby M case. Instead, infertility advocates, such as RESOLVE, would do 
well to partner with the lesbian gay bisexual and transgender (“LGBT”), to 
fight for better access to ART services for all.
116. June Carbone & Jody Lyneé Madeira, Buyers in the Baby Market: Toward A Transparent 
Consumerism, 91 WASH. L. REV. 71, 76 n.21 (2016); see Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive 
Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 39 
(2008) (“Hispanic women, non-Hispanic black women, and other women of color are significantly 
more likely to be infertile than white women.”); see also Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Transformative 
Reproduction, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 187, 222 (2013) (“[A] disproportionate number of infertile 
women in this country are Black.”).
117. I capitalize Black when referring to the racial group. See Kimberle’ Williams Crenshaw, 
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my 
view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as 
such, require denotation as a proper noun”).
118. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
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ROMANTIC DISCRIMINATION AND CHILDREN
SOLANGEL MALDONADO
In recent years, social scientists have used online dating sites to study 
the role of race in the dating and marriage market. Their research has re-
vealed a racialized and gendered hierarchy that disproportionately excludes 
African-American men and women and Asian-American men. For decades, 
other researchers have studied the risks and outcomes for children who 
grow up in single-parent homes as compared to children raised by married 
parents. This Essay explores how racial preferences in the dating market 
potentially affect the children of middle-class African-American mothers 
who lack or reject opportunities to marry.1 What is the relationship between 
racial preferences in the dating and marriage market and children’s access 
to resources and opportunities? Do racial preferences in the dating and 
marriage market increase the likelihood that children of middle-class Afri-
can-American mothers will be raised in homes with fewer resources and 
limited access to opportunities available to other children with similarly 
educated parents? If so, what, if anything, should the law do to minimize 
racial preferences’ effects on children?
I. RACIAL PREFERENCES IN THE DATING AND MARRIAGE MARKET
Americans’ acceptance of interracial intimacy has increased dramati-
cally in just one generation. In 1987, less than 50% of Americans approved 
of African-Americans and Whites dating. By 2013, 87% of all Americans, 
and 96% of 18-29 year olds, approved of marriages (not just dating) be-
tween African-Americans and Whites.2 Yet, despite our approval of inter-
* Joseph M. Lynch Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
1. Legal scholars have examined how racial preferences in the foster care and adoption system 
harm children. See e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1415 (2006); Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial 
Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998); ELIZABETH BARTHOLET,
FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION (Beacon 
Press, 1999).
2. Jeffrey Passel et al., Marrying Out: One-in-Seven New Marriages is Interracial or Inter-
ethnic, PEW RES. CTR. (June 4, 2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/755-marrying-
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racial relationships, most Americans marry individuals of their same race.3
One reason might be opportunity. We tend to date people we meet at 
school, work, or in our neighborhood, but residential and educational seg-
regation and the lower positions racial and ethnic minorities occupy in most 
workplaces limit opportunities for members of different groups to interact 
socially as equals.
Racial preferences are another reason why the majority of cohabitating 
and married couples are of the same race. Just because a person approves 
of interracial relationships does not mean that she herself is willing to mar-
ry across the color line.4 A wealth of data from surveys, online dating, and 
speed dating studies show that when seeking an intimate partner, many
individuals prefer someone of their same race. Racial preferences might 
also explain why some groups have higher intermarriage rates than others. 
Individuals who are open to dating interracially often have preferences for 
members of certain races to the exclusion of others. These preferences re-
veal a racial hierarchy in which Whites, including multiracial individuals 
who are part White (but not part Black), are deemed most desirable, Afri-
can-Americans significantly less so, and other racial or ethnic minorities 
(specifically Asian-Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans) somewhere 
in the middle. This racial hierarchy is gendered with Asian-American men 
and African-American women least preferred in the interracial dating and 
marriage market.
About half of all Americans report that they have dated a person of a 
different race or ethnicity.5 Younger generations and racial and ethnic mi-
norities are even more likely to have dated interracially.6 Yet, even among 
the younger generation we find racial differences in dating patterns. White 
college students are more likely to date Asian-Americans and Latinos than 
3. Debra Blackwell & Daniel Lichter, Homogamy Among Dating, Cohabiting and Married 
Couples, 45 SOC. Q. 719, 732 (2004); Passel et al., supra note 2.
4. Melissa R. Herman & Mary E. Campbell, I Wouldn’t But You Can: Attitudes Toward Interra-
cial Relationships, 41 SOC. SCI. RES. 343, 356 (2012).
5. Jeffrey Jones, Most Americans Approve of Interracial Dating, GALLUP, Oct. 7, 2005, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/19033/most-americans-approve-interracial-dating.aspx.
6. See generally Kara Joyner & Grace Kao, Interracial Relationships and the Transition to 
Adulthood, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 563 (2005). Sixty percent of eighteen to twenty-nine year-olds who 
participated in a Gallup poll reported that they had dated interracially, as did 53% of individuals aged 
thirty to forty-nine, 46% of individuals aged fifty to sixty-four, and 28% of individuals sixty-five and 
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to date African-Americans. African-American college students are also less 
likely than other racial or ethnic minorities to date interracially.7
While the majority of individuals who date or cohabitate interracially 
ultimately do not marry a person of a different race,8 the rate of intermar-
riage has increased significantly since the Supreme Court declared in 1967
that laws prohibiting interracial marriage were unconstitutional.9 In 1960, 
just 2% of marriages in the United States were interracial. Fifty years later, 
in 2010, 15% of marriages celebrated that year were between spouses of 
different races or between Latinos and non-Latinos.10 Yet, race continues to 
influence our romantic choices. In a society where race did not play a role 
in intimate relationships, 44%, not just 15%, of recent marriages would be 
interracial.11
Intermarriage patterns vary widely by race, color, and gender. The ma-
jority of American Indians (58%) marry out, primarily with Whites,12 as do 
7. Elizabeth McClintock, When Does Race Matter? Race, Sex, and Dating at an Elite Universi-
ty, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 45, 48 (2010); Shana Levin et al., Interethnic and Interracial Dating in
College: A Longitudinal Study, 24 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 323, 340 (2007).
8. Herman & Campbell, supra note 4, at 346; George Yancey, Who Interracially Dates: An 
Examination of the Characteristics of Those Who Have Interracially Dated, 33 J. COMP. FAM. STUD.
179, 180 (2002); Blackwell & Lichter, supra note 3, at 720–21. Americans are twice as likely to cohabit 
with a partner of a different race as to marry across race. See also Zhenchao Qian & Daniel Lichter, 
Changing Patterns of Interracial Marriage in a Multiracial Society, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1065, 
1077–79 (2011). For example, in 2010, 18.3% of cohabitating different-sex couples were interracial or 
had a Latino and a non-Latino partner as compared to 9.5% of different-sex married couples. Daphne 
Lofquist et al., Households and Families: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Apr. 2012, at 18–19. Interracial 
cohabiting couples are more likely than same-race couples to break-up and thus are only 60% as likely 
as same-race cohabiting couples to marry. Joyner & Kao, supra note 6, at 574.
9. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
10. Wendy Wang, The Rise of Intermarriage, PEW RES. CTR. 1–3 (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-rise-of-intermarriage/. Latinos are an ethnic group and 
can be of any race. Id. (noting that the term “Latino” or Hispanic refers to persons of Latino/Hispanic 
origin regardless of race). However, researchers treat them as a racial group when comparing differ-
ences in wealth, education, income, fertility patterns, and life expectancy of racial groups. See Jose A. 
Cobas et al., Racializing Latinos: Historical Backgrounds and Current Forms, in HOW THE UNITED 
STATES RACIALIZES LATINOS: WHITE HEGEMONY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1 (Jose A. Cobas et al. eds. 
2009). Many Latinos believe that “Latino” is a race and reject U.S. definitions of race. See Ana Gonza-
lez Barrera & Mark Hugo Lopez, Is Being Hispanic a Matter of Race, Ethnicity, or Both?, PEW RES.
CTR. (June 15, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/15/is-being-hispanic-a-matter-of-
race-ethnicity-or-both/ (reporting that two-thirds of Hispanic say that Hispanic is part of their race. 
Consequently, this Essay follows the approach of the majority of researchers who treat marriages 
between Latinos and non-Latinos as intermarriage and different from marriages between other ethnic 
groups such as Irish-Americans and Italian-Americans.
11. Raymond Fisman et al., Racial Preferences in Dating, 75 REV. ECON. STUD. 117, 117 (2008). 
12. Wendy Wang, Interracial Marriage: Who Is Marrying Out?, PEW RES. CTR., June 12, 2015, 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/12/interracial-marriage-who-is-marrying-out/. Approx-
imately 70% of all interracial marriages involve a White partner. Id. Marriages between minorities of 
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more than one-third of U.S.-born13 Asian-Americans and Latinos, and 17% 
of African-Americans.14 Multiracial individuals who are part White are 
significantly more likely than their mono-racial co-ethnics to have a White 
partner but here too marriage patterns vary by race.15 The majority of 
Asian/White and about half of Latino/White multiracial individuals have a 
White spouse or cohabitating partner.16 In contrast, the majority of African-
American/White multiracial individuals partner with African-Americans.
Intermarriage patterns also vary by skin color. Lighter-skinned minori-
ties are more likely than their darker-skinned counterparts to intermarry 
with Whites. For example, U.S.-born Latinos who identify as racially white 
on the U.S. Census are significantly more likely than their darker counter-
parts to be married to non-Latino Whites.17 Skin tone plays a similar role in 
the intermarriage patterns of U.S.-born Asian-Americans.18 Dark-skinned
minorities who intermarry with Whites are more likely than their lighter-
skinned counterparts to be married to Whites who have attained less formal 
education than themselves—in other words, to marry “down” in terms of 
education.19
The marriage patterns of some groups are not only influenced by race, 
but also by gender. U.S.-born Asian-American women are almost five times
more likely to intermarry than African-American women.20 African-
American men are more than twice as likely as African-American women 
13. Immigrants are significantly less likely than their U.S.-born co-ethnics to intermarry. See
Passel et al., supra note 2 (reporting that 39% of U.S.-born Latinos and 46% of U.S.-born Asian-
Americans who married in 2008 married out as compared to 12% of Latino immigrants and 26% of 
Asian immigrants). See Qian & Lichter, supra note 8, at 1076 (noting that there is no significant differ-
ence between the intermarriage rate of U.S.-born and foreign-born Blacks).
14. Wang, supra note 12 (discussing that 9% of Whites who married in 2010 married out.); 
Wang, supra note 10, at 1.9. 
15. Qian & Lichter, supra note 8, at 1070.
16. Id. at 1071; KIM PARKER ET AL., PEW RES. CTR, MULTIRACIAL IN AMERICA: PROUD,
DIVERSE AND GROWING IN NUMBERS, 80–81 (2015), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2015/06/2015-06-11_multiracial-in-america_final-updated.pdf.
17. Zhenchao Qian, Race and Social Distance: Intermarriage with Non-Latino Whites, 5 RACE &
SOC’Y 33, 33 (2002). Darker-skinned Latinos tend to identify as racially “other” on the U.S. Census. Id.
at 40. Latinos who identify as racially White are twice as likely as Latinos who identify as racially 
Black to be married to non-Latino Whites. See HaeYoun Park, Who Is Marrying Whom, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/01/29/us/20110130mixedrace.html. Latinos 
with American Indian ancestry are also more likely than Latinos with Black ancestors to be married to 
non-Latino Whites. Id.
18. Intermarriage rates with Whites are lowest for African-Americans, slightly higher for dark-
skinned Latinos, higher for lighter-skinned Asian-Americans, and highest for the lightest-skinned 
Latinos. See Qian, supra note 17, at 45.
19. Zhenchao Qian, Breaking the Last Taboo: Interracial Marriage in America, 4 CONTEXTS,
Fall 2005, at 35.
20. Wang, supra note 10, at 9–10 (reporting that 9% of African-American women married out in 
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to marry out. The opposite is true for Asian-American men who are half as 
likely as their female counterparts to intermarry.21
Gays and lesbians are more likely than their heterosexual counterparts 
to have an intimate partner of a different race.22 Yet, the same racial pat-
terns observed in different-sex relationships are apparent in same-sex rela-
tionships. Asian-Americans and Latinos in same- or different-sex 
relationships are significantly more likely than African-Americans to have 
a partner of a different race or ethnicity.23
A. What Drives Interracial Marriage Patterns?
Most married couples do not randomly end up together but rather are 
the result of assortative mating—the tendency of people to date and marry 
individuals like themselves.24 We generally partner with people who are 
similar to us in terms of race, education, and socioeconomic status in part 
because we spend a lot of time with people with similar levels of education 
at school or at work. 25 Our family members, friends, and neighbors also 
tend to be of the same race and similar socioeconomic status. Online dating 
studies suggest, however, that even when the pool of potential mates is not 
limited by whom we meet at school, work, the gym, or local bar, we still 
prefer to date people like ourselves. As one aptly-titled article noted, “In
the End, People May Really Just Want to Date Themselves.”26
21. Id. (reporting that the gender disparity is even greater between foreign-born Asian men and 
women. Foreign-born Asian-American women are three times as likely as their male counterparts to 
marry out (34% v. 11%)).
22. ANGELIKI KASTANIS & BIANCA D.M. WILSON, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, RACE/ETHNICITY,
GENDER, AND SOCIOECONOMIC WELLBEING OF INDIVIDUALS IN SAME-SEX COUPLES 1 (2014). The 
2010 U.S. Census shows that 20% of same-sex households (unmarried) are interracial or interethnic as 
compared to 9.5% of different-sex married couples. Lofquist et al., supra note 8, at 20; GARY J. GATES,
THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, SAME-SEX COUPLES IN CENSUS 2010: RACE & ETHNICITY 4 (2012). Be-
cause few states recognized marriages between persons of the same-sex in 2010, the U.S. Census made 
no distinction between same-sex households in which couples were married and those in which they 
were not. Id. at 1.
23. For example, 67% of Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders and 55% of Latinos as compared 
to 33% of African-Americans in same-sex relationships had a White partner. KASTANIS & WILSON,
supra note 22, at 2.
24. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part I, 81 J. POL. ECON. 813, 813 (1973); MARTIN 
BROWNING ET AL., ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 36–37 (2014); Matthis Kalmijn, Intermarriage and 
Homogamy: Causes, Patterns, Trends, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 395 (1998); JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI 
CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 62 (2014).
25. Kalmijn, supra note 24, at 398. We also tend to marry partners with similar physical traits 
such as attractiveness, height, and weight. Id. at 416–17.
26. Emma Pierson, In the End, People May Really Just Want to Date Themselves,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, Apr. 28, 2014, http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/in-the-end-people-may-really-
just-want-to-date-themselves/. I am grateful to Professor Naomi Schoenbaum at George Washington 
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Dating and marriage outcomes are the result of both preferences and 
opportunities and thus cannot explain whether opportunity, preferences 
(and if so, whose preferences), or both, drive the different rates of interra-
cial coupling. Researchers have addressed the limitations of dating and 
marriage outcomes by directly examining the preferences of individuals 
seeking a romantic partner. Studies that focus on stated preferences—what 
people say they want in a partner—generally ask date-seekers to identify 
the traits they seek in a romantic partner or examine the traits date-seekers 
have identified in a personal ad or online dating profile.27 Not surprisingly, 
individuals may not be completely truthful when describing the traits they 
seek in a partner because they fear they will be judged as superficial, elitist, 
or even racist. Moreover, even when we are completely honest, our stated
preferences may not reflect our true preferences. As evolutionary psy-
chologists have discovered, we often do not know what we really want in a 
mate.28
To address the limitations of stated preferences, researchers have ex-
amined the revealed preferences of online date-seekers by observing how 
they respond when contacted by daters with certain traits.29 For example, 
Günter Hitsch and his colleagues examined the search behaviors of almost 
22,000 heterosexual online daters.30 The date-seekers, who did not know 
that their behaviors would be observed by researchers, provided detailed 
profiles noting their age, gender, race, education, income, height, weight, 
marital status,31 political and religious affiliations, interest in dating some-
27. See Gerald Mendelsohn et al., Black/White Online Dating: Interracial Courtship in the 21st
Century, 3 PSYCHOL. POPULAR MEDIA CULTURE 2, 5 (2014); Belinda Robnett & Cynthia Feliciano, 
Patterns of Racial-Ethnic Exclusion by Internet Daters, 89 SOC. FORCES 807, 810–11 (2011); Günter J. 
Hitsch et al., What Makes You Click—Mate Preferences in Online Dating, 8 QUANT. MARKETING &
ECON. 393, 397 (2010) [hereinafter Hitsch et al., What Makes You Click].
28. See Paul W. Eastwick & Eli J. Finkel, Sex Differences in Mate Preferences Revisited: Do 
People Know What They Initially Desire in a Romantic Partner?, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
245, 245 (2008).
29. See, e.g., Ken-Hou Lin & Jennifer Lundquist, Mate Selection in Cyberspace: The Intersection 
of Race, Gender, and Education, 119 AM. J. SOC. 183, 183 (2013); CHRISTIAN RUDDER, DATACLYSM:
LOVE, SEX, RACE, AND IDENTITY—WHAT OUR ONLINE LIVES TELL US ABOUT OUR OFFLINE SELVES 
109–16 (2014) (discussing that almost 75% of Internet users who are seeking romantic partners have 
used the Internet to meet potential dates); Lin & Lundquist, supra at 203; see also DAN SLATER, LOVE 
IN THE TIME OF ALGORITHMS: WHAT TECHNOLOGY DOES TO MEETING AND MATING 103 (2013); 
Michael J. Rosenfeld & Reuben J. Thomas, Searching for a Mate: The Rise of the Internet as a Social 
Intermediary, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 523 (2012).
30. Hitsch et al., What Makes You Click, supra note 27, at 398.
31. Some married individuals who are separated or in the process of divorcing search for their 
next relationship online while still legally married. A small percentage of married individuals who have 
no intention of divorcing their spouse also use these sites even though there are sites devoted exclusive-
ly to individuals seeking a partner for an affair such as Ashley Madison, which markets itself as the 
world’s leading married dating service for discreet encounters. See ASHLEY MADISON,
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one of a different ethnic background, and whether they were seeking a 
casual or long-term relationship. Many users also provided a photo which 
the researchers rated for physical attractiveness based on the opinions of 
objective observers.32 Date-seekers browsed other users’ profiles and sent 
emails to individuals they might want to date.
Not surprisingly, online daters’ search behaviors revealed a universal 
preference for physically attractive individuals with high incomes. Howev-
er, women valued a man’s income more highly than his physical appear-
ance, and men ranked a woman’s physical attractiveness above her 
income.33 Online daters’ search behaviors also revealed strong racial pref-
erences even when they did not state those preferences. For example, 55% 
of the women expressed no racial preferences in their profiles, but their 
revealed preferences—who they contacted and who they responded to 
when contacted—showed equally strong preferences as the women who 
had expressed a racial preference.34 In other words, 95% of female online
daters in Hitsch’s study had racial preferences even though only 41% stated 
those preferences in their profiles.
Other online dating studies have revealed racial preferences.35 They 
also reveal a racial hierarchy of preferences. For example, the majority of 
straight White men in an online dating study conducted by Cynthia Felici-
ano and her colleagues stated a racial preference. The majority also ex-
32. The researchers hired college students who rated photos of 400 male faces and 400 female 
faces on a scale of one to ten. The researchers used each picture approximately twelve times. “Con-
sistent with findings in a large literature in cognitive psychology, attractiveness ratings by independent 
observers appear to be positively correlated.” Hitsch et al., What Makes You Click, supra note 27, at 
401.
33. Id. Other studies have similarly found that date-seekers prefer attractive partners. See East-
wick & Finkel, supra note 28, at 245; Raymond Fisman et al., Gender Differences in Mate Selection: 
Evidence from a Speed Dating Experiment, 2 Q.J. ECON. 673, 673 (2006); Regan et al., Partner Prefer-
ences: What Characteristics do Men and Women Desire in Their Short Term Sexual and Long Run 
Romantic Partners, 12 J. PSYCH. & HUM. SEXUALITY 1 (2008). Other studies have similarly found that 
men care more about looks and women care more about income and status. For example, one speed 
dating study of graduate and professional students found that women preferred men who had been 
raised in affluent neighborhoods while men had no such preferences. See Fisman et al., Gender Differ-
ences, supra note 11; see also Günter J. Hitsch et al., Matching and Sorting in Online Dating, 100 AM.
ECON. REV. 130, 147–148 (2010) [hereinafter Hitsch et al., Matching and Sorting]. Older studies have 
similarly found that men value a woman’s physical appearance over her intelligence and ambition but 
women (at least when seeking a partner for a long-term relationship) care more about a man’s earning 
potential, intelligence, and social status. See David Buss, The Strategies of Human Mating, 82 AM.
SCIENTIST 238, 240 (1994); Pamela Regan, Minimum Mate Selection Standards as a Function of Per-
ceived Mate Value, Relationship Context, and Gender, 10 J. PSYCH. & HUM. SEXUALITY 53, 68 (1998). 
However, some studies have found that both genders value physical attractiveness above other traits. 
See, e.g., Eastwick & Finkel, supra note 28, at 245; Robert Kurzban & Jason Weeden, Do Advertised 
Preferences Predict the Behavior of Speed Daters?, 14 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 623, 631–32 (2007).
34. Hitsch et al., What Makes You Click, supra note 27, at 424. Another study found similar 
results. See Fisman et al., Racial Preferences, supra note 11, at 118–19.
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pressed interest or willingness to date interracially.36 However, they were 
quite specific about which groups they were willing to date. About 50% of 
White men who stated a racial preference expressly excluded Asian-
American women and similar numbers excluded Latina women. Yet, more 
than 90% refused to consider African-American women. The chart below 
illustrates this hierarchy.
Source: Cynthia Feliciano et al., Gendered Racial Exclusion among 
White Internet Daters, 38 Social Science Research 39 (2009)
It is no longer socially acceptable to express racial preferences in most 
contexts37 and it is illegal to act upon such preferences in settings such as educa-
tion, employment, and housing. In fact, 84% of online daters in one study stated 
that they would not date someone “who has vocalized a strong negative bias to-
ward a certain race of people.”38 Despite this strong anti-discrimination norm, 
studies have found a racial hierarchy in which White men rank African-American 
women significantly below Asian-American, Latina, or White women.39 This 
hierarchy is also reflected in straight White men’s response rates when contacted 
by female online date-seekers. White men are most likely to respond to messages 
from White women and from multiracial Asian-American and Latina women who 
36. Cynthia Feliciano et al., Gendered Racial Exclusion Among White Internet Daters, 38 SOC.
SCI. RES. 39, 45, 49 (2009). About one-third of White men who expressed a racial preference preferred 
to date White women only. Id.
37. Bonilla-Silva & Baiocchi, Any But Racism: How Sociologists Limit the Significance of Rac-
ism, 4 RACE & SOC’Y 117, 119 (2001); Charles Gallagher, The End of Racism as the New Doxa: New 
Strategies for Researching Race, in WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY 163 
(Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., 2008).
38. Rudder, supra note 29, at 112–13. 
39. George Yancey, Crossracial Differences in the Racial Preferences of Potential Dating Part-
ners: A Test of the Alienation of African-Americans and Social Dominance Orientation, 50 THE SOC. Q.
121, 130 (2009); Glenn Tsunokai et al., Racial Preferences in Internet Dating: A Comparison of Four 
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are part White.40 They are less likely to respond to multiracial African-
American/White women, and almost never respond to messages from African-
American women.41
White women’s preferences also reveal a racial hierarchy. Almost 75% of 
straight White women in Feliciano’s study expressed racial preferences and a ma-
jority of those (64%) preferred to date White men only. 42 Although most White 
women excluded all non-White men, they were more than twice as likely to ex-
clude African-American and Asian-American men as compared to Latino men.43
Data from millions of online daters on Match (the most popular dating 
site in the U.S for the last 20 years), OkCupid, and Date Hookup confirm the racial 
hierarchy in the online dating market.44 Straight White women on these sites rated 
Asian-American and African-American men as significantly less attractive than the 
average man.45 This hierarchy is also reflected in White women’s response rates 
when contacted by online date-seekers. Several studies conducted by Curington, 
Lin, and Lundquist revealed that White women respond mainly to White men and 
ignore messages from men of other races with one exception—multiracial men 
who are part White.46 While more than 90% of White women rejected Asian men 
as potential dates, they responded to messages from multiracial Asian/White men 
at similar rates as they did to messages from mono-racial White men.47 They also 
responded to Latino/White men and African-American/White men at higher rates 
than their mono-racial counterparts.48
Online date-seekers have many preferences, including age, body type, ed-
ucation, income, and religion. But race ranks particularly high on their preferences. 
For example, while 59% of straight White men in Feliciano’s study stated a racial 
preference, only 23% expressed a religious preference.49 For these men, a wom-
an’s race was more important than her education, religion, employment, marital 
status, or whether she smoked. Straight White date-seekers on the online dating 
site OkCupid revealed similarly strong preferences for Whites even when the sys-
tem’s algorithm determined that their best “match,” based on their responses to 
approximately 300 questions about their beliefs, needs, wants, and activities they 
enjoy, was a person of a different race.50
College-educated minorities and Latinos/as are more likely to intermarry 
40. Celeste Vaughn Curington et al., Positioning Multiraciality in Cyberspace: Treatment of 
Multiracial Daters in an Online Dating Website, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 10 (2015); RUDDER, supra note 
29, at 116–17.
41. Curington, supra note 40, at 10; RUDDER, supra note 29.
42. Feliciano et al., supra note 36, at 47. 
43. 77% of White women with a stated racial preference excluded Latino men but 91% excluded 
African-American men and 93% excluded Asian men. Only 4% excluded White men. Id.
44. RUDDER, supra note 29, at 114–15.
45. Id.
46. Curington et al., supra note 40; Lin & Lundquist, supra note 29, at 203–04. 
47. Curington et al., supra note 40, at 18.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Feliciano et al., supra note 36, at 45.
50. Christian Rudder, Race and Attraction, 2009-2014, OKTRENDS (Sept. 10, 2014), 
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than their less-educated counterparts,51 so one might assume that college-educated 
Americans as a group have weaker racial preferences. However, online dating 
studies suggest otherwise. Hitsch’s study of heterosexual online daters discussed 
above found that the vast majority of White women, regardless of their level of 
education or income, have strong preferences for White men.52 Feliciano and her 
colleagues found that college-educated Whites are more likely than Whites with 
only a high school education to exclude African-Americans as romantic partners.53
And Lin and Lundquist found that racial preferences trumped educational prefer-
ences.54 College-educated Whites are more likely to contact and respond to mes-
sages from Whites without a college degree than to messages from African-
Americans with a college degree.55 White men without a college degree received 
more messages than college-educated African-American and Asian-American 
men.56 College-educated African-American women received significantly fewer 
messages than women of other races with lower levels of educational attainment.57
Racial minorities and Latinos are generally more willing than Whites to date 
interracially,58 yet their preferences reflect a similar racial hierarchy. For example, 
70% of straight Asian-American and Latina women in an online dating study con-
ducted by Belinda Robnett and Cynthia Feliciano expressed a racial preference and 
51. Wang, supra note 10, at 20–21 (reporting that college-educated second generation (U.S.-born 
children of immigrants) Latinos/as are almost three times as likely to marry out as their counterparts 
with only a high school degree (43% v. 16%)); See PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., SECOND 
GENERATION AMERICANS: A PORTRAIT OF THE ADULT CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS 58 ( 2013); See
Wang, The Rise of Intermarriage, supra note 10, at 20, 24 (reporting that 60% of Asian-Americans who 
intermarried with Whites in 2010 had a college degree as compared to 49% of all Asian-American 
adults in the U.S.); PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., THE RISE OF ASIAN AMERICANS 25 (2013), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/04/Asian-Americans-new-full-report-04-2013.pdf; Qian & 
Lichter, supra note 8, at 1077 (finding that “educational attainment among Blacks in 2008 was signifi-
cantly associated with marriages to Whites. When both partners had at least a college education the 
odds of marrying out were more than twice as high than when both partners had only a high school 
diploma or less.”). The majority of recently married couples (interracial or same-race) share similar 
levels of formal education. But when African-Americans and Latinos marry a White partner whose 
level of education differs from theirs, the White spouse tends to be the less-educated partner. See Qian, 
supra note 19. Some research suggests that less-educated Whites trade their higher racial status for 
minority partners with higher educational and economic status while high-achieving minorities trade 
their class status for White spouses with higher racial status. See Aaron Gullickson & Vincent Kang Fu, 
Comment, An Endorsement of Exchange Theory in Mate Selection, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1243, 1243 (2010); 
Vincent Kang Fu, Racial Intermarriage Pairings, 38 DEMOGRAPHY 147, 147 (2001).
52. Hitsch et al., What Makes You Click, supra note 27, at 425.
53. Feliciano et al., supra note 36, at 49; see also Tsunokai et al., supra note 39, at 10.
54. Lin & Lundquist, supra note 29, at 183.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 209. 
57. Id.
58. For example, one study found that while a majority of straight White women stated that they 
preferred to date only White men, only 6% of Asian-American women and 16% of Latina women 
preferred to date only men of their same race. See Feliciano, supra note 36, at 46–48. Minorities are 
also more willing to date Whites than Whites are to dating them. Id. at 51; Mendelsohn et al., supra 
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overwhelmingly excluded minority men other than their co-ethics.59 The vast ma-
jority, however, were willing to date White men. 60
This racial hierarchy is also reflected in Asian-American and Latina 
women’s response rates when contacted by online daters.61 They are most likely to 
respond to emails from White men and their multiracial co-ethnics who are part 
White (Asian-American/White men and Latino/White men) than to messages from 
their mono-racial co-ethnics.62 Surveys of college students’ dating preferences 
have also found that many Latinos and Asian-Americans prefer Whites to other 
groups, including their own co-ethnics.63
The preferences of straight Asian-American and Latino men also reflect a 
racial hierarchy. For example, Robnett and Feliciano found that over 60% of 
Asian-American and Latino men who expressed a racial preference were willing to 
date White women, but less than 20% were willing to date African-American 
women.64 Approximately 50% of Asian-American men were willing to date Latina 
women and similar numbers of Latino men were willing to date Asian-American 
women.65 The graphs below illustrate the preferences of straight Asian-American 
and Latino men.
59.  Feliciano et al., supra note 36, at 46–48.
60.  Id.; see generally Glenn T. Tsunokai, Allison R. McGrath, & Jillian K. Kavanagh, Online
Dating Preferences of Asian Americans, 31 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 796 (2014).
61.  Curington et al., supra note 40, at 12.
62.  Lin & Lundquist, supra note 29, at 207; Rudder, supra note 50. 
63. Liu et al., Ethnocentrism in Dating Preferences for an American Sample: The Ingroup Bias in
Social Context, 25 EURO. J. OF SOC. PSYCH. 95, 95 (1995).
64.  Belinda Robnett & Cynthia Feliciano, Patterns of Racial-Ethnic Exclusion by Internet Daters,
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American/White women as significantly more attractive than mono-racial African-
American women but as less attractive than women of other races.71
The preferences revealed by these studies are consistent across daters of 
different ages, incomes, education, geographic location (including urban v. rural 
dwellers), and self-identification as liberal or conservative.72 Speed dating studies 
and surveys of college students’ preferences have found a similar racial hierar-
chy.73 For example, 381 college students at a public university in California com-
pleted an anonymous questionnaire that asked them to describe the traits they 
desire in a romantic partner, whether they were willing to date someone of a dif-
ferent race, and if so, to rank their preferred racial or ethnic groups and explain 
their reasons for their rankings.74 All of the non-Black male students who ex-
pressed racial preferences ranked African-American women last75 but White stu-
dents were significantly less likely than Asian-American or Latino students to 
report any racial preferences or to expressly exclude African-Americans.76 How-
ever, students’ explanations for their preferences reveal a racialized and gendered 
hierarchy fueled by Western notions of beauty, stereotypes, and family and societal 
disapproval. Students’ most commonly stated reasons for excluding African-
Americans or ranking them last included lack of physical attraction, cultural differ-
ences, perceived aggressive personality or behavior, and social disapproval.77
Rates of exclusion varied by gender. Heterosexual White male students were more 
than twice as likely as their female counterparts (67% v. 30%) to exclude African-
Americans as potential dates.78 Asian-American males were also more likely than 
females to exclude African-Americans as potential dates.79 Men were more than 
twice as likely as women to cite lack of physical attraction (such as skin tone, hair 
texture, and body type) as reasons for excluding African-Americans as potential 
dates.80
As noted earlier, all daters prefer physically attractive partners.81 Beauty 
may be in the eye of the beholder but throughout most of the Western world, a 
light complexion and phenotypically European features, such as straight hair and a 
71. RUDDER, supra note 29, at 117.
72. Id.
73. See Fisman et al., supra note 11, at 126; Fisman et al., supra note 33, at 674; James A. Bany 
et al., Gendered Black Exclusion: The Persistence of Racial Stereotypes Among Daters, 6 RACE & SOC.
PROB. 201, 202 (2014).
74. Bany et al., supra note 73, at 201.
75. Id. at 209.
76. Approximately 80% of Asian-American, African-American, and Latino students as compared 
to 49% of White students reported a racial preference. While 80% of Asian American and 66% of 
Latino students excluded African-Americans as potential dates, approximately half of White students 
(49%) did the same. Id. at 206.
77. Id. at 209. 
78. Id. at 206.
79. Id.
80. Bany et al., supra note 73 at 208. For example, some non-Black men wrote: “Too dark,” “I
generally don’t like curly hair or dark skin.” “Because African-American women are usually bigger 
broader physically type people.” “I just don’t like to date anyone who has really dark skin . . . anyone 
but Black.” Id.
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narrow nose, are perceived as most attractive, especially for women.82 These phys-
ical features are deemed desirable not only by Whites but also by African-
Americans and other minority groups.83 As scholars have asserted, light “skin tone 
is also a form of social capital that grants access to . . . marriage to higher status 
men.”84 One need only name a few African-American female celebrities consid-
ered universally beautiful (such as Beyoncé Knowles, Halle Berry, and Alicia 
Keys) to conclude that women with lighter skin and more Eurocentric features are 
perceived as most attractive.85
Gendered and racialized stereotypes affect how individuals are perceived 
in the dating market. For example, one study found that White men who expressed 
a body type preference were more likely to exclude African-American women as 
dates, presumably because they associated African-American women with a par-
ticular body type.86 Another study found that the more highly a man valued femi-
ninity, the higher the likelihood that he would express interest in dating Asian-
American women but not African-American woman.87 Several studies have found 
82. KIMBERLY JADE NORWOOD, COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF A POST-
RACIAL AMERICA 123 (2013); PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK SEXUAL POLITICS: AFRICAN-
AMERICANS, GENDER, AND THE NEW RACISM 123 (2005); Verna Keith, A Colorstruck World: Skin 
Tone, Achievement, and Self-Esteem Among African-American Women, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE:
WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS 25 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn, ed. 2009).
83. Keith, supra note 82 at 25; JOANNE L. RONDILLA & PAUL SPICKARD, IS LIGHTER BETTER?:
SKIN-TONE DISCRIMINATION AMONG ASIAN AMERICANS 1–2 (2007); see generally Andrés Villarreal, 
Stratification by Skin Color in Contemporary Mexico, 75 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 652 (2010). For 
example, African-Americans (male and female) rate lighter-complexioned African-American women, 
but not men, as more attractive than those with darker complexions. Mark Hill, Skin Color and the 
Perception of Attractiveness Among African- American: Does Gender Make a Difference?, 65 SOC.
PSYCH. Q. 77 (2002). As scholars have noted, some African-Americans have internalized the majority’s
preference for light skin. See Bond & Cash, Black Beauty: Skin Color and Body Images Among Afri-
can-American College Women, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 874 (1992); Ronald E. Hall, Bias Among 
African-Americans Regarding Skin Color: Implications for Social Work Practice, 2 RES. SOC. WORK 
PRAC. 479, (1992); Ronald E. Hall, Skin Color Bias: A New Perspective on an Old Problem, 132 J.
PSYCH. 238 (1998); See EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, Consuming Lightness: Segmented Markets and 
Global Capital in the Skin-Whitening Trade, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE 168 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn, 
ed. 2009) (Asian-American and Latina women (in the U.S. and abroad) have similarly internalized the 
preference for lighter skin as shown by their expenditure of billions of dollars on skin lightening prod-
ucts each year); Charles Blow, A Bias More Than Skin Deep, N.Y. Times (July 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/opinion/charles-blow-a-bias-more-than-skin-deep.html?_r=0; 
Monisha Rajesh, India’s Unfair Obsession With Lighter Skin, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 14, 2013, 12:32 
PM, https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2013/aug/14/indias-dark-obsession-fair-skin; G.P. 
Abuja, Beauty in Nigeria: Lighter Shades of Skin, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2012/09/beauty-nigeria.
84. Keith, supra note 82, at 26.
85. As the African-American Emmy award winning actress Viola Davis retorted when a New 
York Times journalist referred to her as “darker-skinned and less classically beautiful” than lighter-
skinned Black actresses, this is simply “a fancy term of saying ugly.” Yesha Callahan, Viola Davis 
Responds to Being Called “Less Classically Beautiful,” THE ROOT, Sept. 26, 2014, 
http://www.theroot.com/blog/the-
grapevine/viola_davis_responds_to_being_called_less_classically_beautiful_you_define/.
86. Feliciano et al., supra note 36, at 49.
87. Adam D. Galinsky et al., Gendered Races: Implications for Interracial Marriage, Leadership 
Selection, and Athletic Participation, 24 PSYCH. SCI. 498, 502 (2013). Straight women tend to prefer 
men with masculine traits and straight men tend to prefer women with feminine traits. Id. at 501; see
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that Americans perceive Asian-Americans to be more feminine than other groups, 
and African-Americans to be more masculine.88 They also associate dark skin with 
masculinity.89 Given the importance that men place on a partner’s physical appear-
ance, and the value all races place on light skin on women, it is not surprising that 
lighter-skinned women are higher in the racial hierarchy of the dating market.
Societal notions of masculinity and femininity are reflected in stereotypes 
and media portrayals of minority groups. Asian-American women are depicted as 
hyper-feminine, Asian-American men are portrayed as effeminate and asexual, and 
African-American men are depicted as hyper-masculine.90 Although the media is 
beginning to portray African-American women as desirable partners,91 historically, 
cultural depictions of Black women have generally been limited to images of ma-
tronly caregivers, sexually immoral, or emasculating, angry women.92
Gender differences in the racial hierarchy are also apparent when one ex-
amines stereotypes about different groups’ personalities and behaviors. Although 
straight women (and gay men) reject African-American men at high rates, African-
American women are excluded at even higher rates. Studies show that while both 
men and women rely on stereotypes about African-Americans’ “aggressive per-
sonality” as a reason for excluding them as dates, straight men are significantly 
more likely than straight women to do so.93 Their stated reasons reflect cultural 
assumptions about African-American women as emasculating, domineering, and 
angry and African-American men as dangerous.94 While the stereotype of African-
American men as hyper-masculine and sexually aggressive fuels the perception 
88. Johnson et al., Race is Gendered: How Covarying Phenotypes and Stereotypes Bias Sex 
Categorization, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 116 (2012); Galinsky et al., supra note 87, at 502.
89. Hill, supra note 83, at 77–78. For example, on study found that when White college students 
looked at facial photos of African-American women, they sometimes mistook them for male faces. See
Phillip Atiba Goff at al., Ain’t I a Woman: Towards and Intersectional Approach to Person Perceptions 
and Group-Based Harms, 59 SEX ROLES 392 (2008); Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The 
State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1321 n. 52 (2009); Johnson et 
al., supra note 88, at 127.
90. See generally COLLINS, supra note 82; KASTANIS & WILSON, supra note 22, at 1.
91. For example, Kerry Washington, the lead character in the television drama, Scandal. It is 
worth noting that Shonda Rhimes, the creator of Scandal, is an African-American woman.
92. See generally COLLINS, supra note 82. These images continue to predominate. For example, 
as recently as 2014, the New York Times referred to the producer of programs with African-American 
characters as “an angry Black woman.” Alessandra Stanley, Wrought in Rhimes’ Image, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/arts/television/viola-davis-plays-shonda-rhimess-
latest-tough-heroine.html.
93. For example, 50% of Latino college students in the California study as compared to 10% of 
Latina students and 29% of White males as compared to 9% of White females cited aggressive person-
ality and behavior when describing their reasons for excluding African-Americans. Male students wrote 
that African-American women are “abrasive” and have “attitude problems” and “large chips on their 
shoulders.” Bany et al., supra note 73, at 208. Some female students similarly reported that they would 
not date African-American men because they have aggressive personalities. One woman cited African-
American men’s “gangster style” and another wrote that some African-American men “tend to be 
violent.” See also Rose Weitz & Leonard Gordon, Images of Black Women Among Anglo College 
Students, 28 SEX ROLES 19, 19 (1993) (studying White college students’ perceptions of African-
American women). 
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that they are threatening and dangerous, these are also traits that some straight 
women (and gay men) find appealing.95
Many college students in the California public university study expressed 
concern that family members and society in general would not approve if they 
dated African-Americans.96 Another study of White college students’ racial atti-
tudes similarly found that they feared family and societal disapproval if they mar-
ried interracially.97 Interestingly, Asian-Americans and Latinos/as were 
significantly more likely than Whites to cite social disapproval as a reason to ex-
clude African-Americans as romantic partners.98 The frequency of these concerns 
varied by gender. Asian-American and Latina students were significantly more 
likely than their male counterparts to express concern that parents, friends, and 
strangers would disapprove and they feared they would be discriminated against if 
they dated African-American men.99 These concerns are not unfounded. Interracial 
couples face greater opposition and disapproval from family members and society 
than same-race couples.100
Parents’ objections to their children’s interracial relationships confirm the 
racial hierarchy apparent in the dating market. Asian-American, Latino, and White 
parents all express greater objections to their children intermarrying with African-
Americans as compared to other groups.101 They express fear that society will 
discriminate against their adult children and mixed-race grandchildren, and also 
express concern about the racial identity and psychological well-being of mixed-
race grandchildren.102 Although not always expressly stated or acknowledged, 
parents also fear their own potential loss of status. One study found that Latino 
parents express disapproval of intimacy with African-Americans even before their 
95. Bany et al., supra note 73, at 209 (reporting female student’s comment on African-American 
men’s “attractive skin color and body type.”). Small percentages of White women, specifically women 
who prefer very tall and masculine men, have strong preferences for African-American men. See Felici-
ano et al., supra note 36, at 49. Pornography sites are filled with images of interracial sexual activity 
between dark-skinned Black men and White women, reflecting and reinforcing the stereotype of Black 
men as well-endowed and sexually gifted. See Gail Dines, The White Man’s Burden: Gonzo Pornogra-
phy and the Construction of Black Masculinity, 18 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 283, 285 (2006). See gener-
ally RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION
(2004).
96. Bany et al., supra note 73, at 207
97. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva & Tyrone A. Forman, “I Am Not a Racist But . . .”: Mapping White 
College Students’ Racial Ideology in the USA, Discourse & SOC’Y, 50, 60–62 (2000).
98. Fifty-five percent of Asian-Americans, 39% of Latinos, but only 10% of White students with 
expressed racial preferences listed social disapproval as a reason for excluding African-Americans. 
Bany et al., supra note 73.
99. Bany et al., supra note 73, at 207. 
100. Family members express concern that the interracial couple will face societal disapproval and 
that neighbors, teachers, and strangers will treat them and their offspring differently. See Erica Morales, 
Parental Messages Concerning Latino/Black Interracial Dating: An Exploratory Study Among Latina/o 
Young Adults, in 10:3 LATINO STUDIES 316 (Lourdes Torres, ed., (2012)); Jennifer Lee & Frank D. 
Bean, America’s Changing Color Lines: Immigration, Race/Ethnicity, and Multiracial Identification,
30 ANN. REV. SOC. 221, 225 (2004). 
101. GEORGE YANCEY, WHO IS WHITE?: LATINOS, ASIANS, AND THE NEW BLACK/NON-BLACK 
DIVIDE 70 (2003); Wang, The Rise of Intermarriage, supra note 10, at 39; Morales, supra note 100, at 
320; EILEEN O’BRIEN, THE RACIAL MIDDLE: LATINOS AND ASIAN AMERICANS LIVING BEYOND THE 
RACIAL DIVIDE 96 (2008); Feliciano et al., supra note 36, at 46–48.
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children start dating because they fear jeopardizing the family’s status in the racial 
hierarchy.103 Other studies have found that White parents are similarly concerned 
about the loss of status for the family, especially when the child marries an Afri-
can-American partner.104
Parents’ objections to children’s interracial relationships reflect not only a ra-
cialized hierarchy, but also a gendered one. Their reactions to the relationship 
depend not only on the race of the child’s partner but also the gender. Families are 
much more likely to express strong disapproval when daughters (as compared to
sons) date or marry out.105 For example, White women in interracial relationships 
experience greater disapproval than White men dating minority women or minority 
men dating White women.106 Latino parents are similarly more likely to express 
opposition when daughters (as compared to sons) date African-Americans.107
Societal disapproval of interracial relationships also depends on the race 
and gender of the minority spouse. Numerous commentators have noted greater 
objections from both African-Americans and Whites to relationships between 
African-American men and White women as compared to relationships between 
African-American women and White men.108 In fact, a 2005 Gallup poll found that 
while 72% of Whites approve of a White man dating an African-American woman, 
only 65% approve of an African-American man dating a White woman.109 White 
women married to Asian-American men also experience greater objections from 
103. Id. at 327–28. Latinos, including immigrants with African ancestry, are aware of African-
Americans’ stigmatized status in the U.S., see R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, 
and Equality in Context, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2004); SUZANNE OBOLER, ETHNIC LABELS,
LATINO LIVES: IDENTITY AND THE POLITICS OF (RE)PRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1995); 
TATCHO MINDIOLA ET AL., BLACK-BROWN RELATIONS AND STEREOTYPES 71–2 (2002); Arnold K. Ho 
et al., Evidence for Hypodescent and Racial Hierarchy in the Categorization and Perception of Biracial 
Individuals, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 492, 492 (2011) (noting that Whites and minorities 
agree that “Whites have the highest social status, followed by Asians, Latinos, and Blacks.”); See
generally Kimberly Kahn et al., The Space between Us and Them: Perceptions of Status Differences, 12
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 591 (2009), and fear that a child’s relationship with an Afri-
can-American partner will jeopardize the higher racial status Latinos enjoy (or believe they enjoy). 
Morales, supra note 100, at 325. They also assume they must distance themselves from African-
Americans to achieve social mobility. Id. at 328; see O’BRIEN, supra note 101, at 54 (some Latino 
adults refuse to date African-Americans for the same reasons).
104. MARIA ROOT, LOVE’S REVOLUTION: INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE 60 (2001). 
105. M. Belinda Tucker & Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, Social Structural and Psychological Corre-
lates of Interethnic Dating, 12 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 341–346, 353 (1995); Morales, supra
note 100, at 328; Erica Chito Childs, Families on the Color-Line: Patrolling Borders and Crossing 
Boundaries, 5 RACE & SOC’Y 139, 156 (2002); HEATHER DALMAGE, TRIPPING ON THE COLOR LINE:
BLACK-WHITE MULTIRACIAL FAMILIES IN A RACIALLY DIVIDED WORLD 58 (2000); ERICA CHITO 
CHILDS, NAVIGATING INTERRACIAL BORDERS: BLACK/WHITE COUPLES AND THEIR SOCIAL WORLDS 
69 (2005). 
106. ROOT, supra note 104, at 60 (Root concluded that women’s status is influenced by her male 
partner’s status so family members are concerned when they partner with men of lower racial status. In 
contrast, men’s status is not tied to their female partner’s status); see also Suzanne C. Miller et al., 
Perceived Reactions to Interracial Romantic Relationships: When Race Is Used as a Cue to Status, 7 
GROUP PROCESSES AND INTERGROUP REL 354, 355 (2004). 
107. Morales, supra note 100, at 328.
108. ROOT, supra note 104, at 60; ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS:
RHINELANDER V. RHINELANDER AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY 141–43 (2013).
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both the White and Asian-American communities than Asian-American women 
married to White men.110
Racial preferences are problematic for many reasons. They undermine our 
commitment to anti-discrimination and perpetuate social distance between groups. 
They also affect marriage outcomes. The two groups least preferred by online 
daters—African-American women and Asian-American men—are also the groups 
with the lowest rates of intermarriage. For African-American women, racial pref-
erences affect not only their rate of intermarriage, but their likelihood of marrying 
at all and raising a child without a co-parent.
Marriage rates and non-marital birth rates vary significantly by education. 
College-educated women are more likely to marry than women with lower levels 
of formal education.111 They are also significantly less likely to have children 
outside of marriage.112 However, African-American women are much less likely to 
marry than women of other races113 and are also more likely than women of other 
races to have non-marital children and to raise them in single-parent households.114
While two-parent households are not superior to single-parent households, in the 
United States children raised by single parents are less advantaged in myriad ways, 
even when the single-parent has financial resources. The next section will briefly 
describe these relative disadvantages.
II. ROMANTIC PREFERENCES’ EFFECTS ON CHILDREN
For most of U.S. history, non-marital children suffered significant legal and 
societal discrimination. Most, although not all, of the legal disabilities have been 
eliminated as a result of U.S. Supreme Court decisions striking down laws denying 
non-marital children the same rights enjoyed by marital children.115 Societal dis-
approval of non-marital families has also decreased as children are increasingly 
raised by cohabitating or single parents. Despite these changes, non-marital chil-
110. KUMIKO NEMOTO, RACING ROMANCE: LOVE, POWER, AND DESIRE AMONG ASIAN 
AMERICAN/WHITE COUPLES 6 (2009) (One ethnographic study found that White men married to Asian 
women could not recall any instances of public discrimination against them because of their relation-
ship. In contrast, White women married to Asian-American men reported negative comments from 
friends and neighbors about their choice of mate.).
111. PEW RES. CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 4 (2010), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-families/.
112. See Rachel M. Shattuck & Rose M. Kreider, Social and Economic Characteristics of Current-
ly Unmarried Women with a Recent Birth: 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 4 (May 2013), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-21.pdf (finding that non-marital birth rate for college-
educated women was less than 9% as compared to 57% for women with less than a high school diplo-
ma).
113. 14% of White women ages thirty-five to forty-nine have never been married as compared to 
43.6% of African-American women of the same age. Id.
114. Although the non-marital birth rate has been declining since 2008, approximately 70% of 
children born to African-American mothers are non-marital. See Brady Hamilton et al., Births: Prelimi-
nary Data for 2015, in 65.3 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 10 (2016), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr65/nvsr65_03.pdf. 29% of children born to White mothers and 
53% of children born to Latina mothers in 2015 were non-marital. Id. Asian-Americans have the lowest 
rate (16%) of non-marital births. Id. See also Shattuck & Krieder, supra note 112, at 4.
115. See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against 
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dren are disadvantaged relative to their marital counterparts in many ways. First, as 
I have described in prior work, the law continues to places heavier burdens on non-
marital children in a number of areas, including parental support for college, intes-
tate succession, and paternal transmission of U.S. citizenship.116 Second, non-
marital children continue to experience societal disapproval. The majority of 
Americans, including African-Americans and Latinos, believe that non-marital 
childbearing is a significant social problem and that unmarried women should not 
have children117 Although the majority of non-marital children do not receive 
government benefits, society presumes that they will rely on public assistance for 
their support which contributes to their stigmatization.118 Non-marital African-
American children face greater disapproval than White children, especially when 
they are poor.119
Non-marital children are disadvantaged in virtually every measure, with 
consequences that extend into adulthood.120 Numerous studies have shown that 
children who grow up in a single-parent home or with cohabitating parents121 are 
more likely than children raised by married parents to be poor,122 underachieve 
116. Id. at 349.
117. PEW RES. CENTER, GENERATION GAP IN VALUES, BEHAVIORS: AS MARRIAGE AND 
PARENTHOOD DRIFT APART, PUBLIC IS CONCERNED ABOUT SOCIAL IMPACT 3 (2007), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2007/07/01/as-marriage-and-parenthood-drift-apart-public-is-
concerned-about-social-impact/ (71% of participants stated that the increase in non-marital births is a 
“big problem” for society); Id. at 5 (59% believe that unmarried women having children is wrong and 
66% believe that “[s]ingle women having children” is bad for society). Although Latinos and African-
Americans have high non-marital birth rates than whites, they are almost as likely as whites to believe 
that non-marital childbearing is wrong. Id. at 8–9. More men (73%) than women (60%) believe that 
single women having children is bad for society. Id. at 50. Interestingly, most participants (67%) 
thought that children are better off when unhappy parents divorce rather staying together. Id. at 6. They 
were more accepting of divorce than non-marital childbearing. See also PEW RES. CTR., supra note 111,
at 2 (finding that 69% of study participants “say the trend toward more single women having children is 
bad for society, and 61% say that a child needs both a mother and father to grow up happily.”).
118. Maldonado, supra note 115, at 367–71.
119. Jane D. Bock, Doing the Right Thing? Single Mothers by Choice and the Struggle for Legiti-
macy, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 62, 65 (2000) (noting that “[t]he levels of stigma . . . vary according to the 
class, race, and age of the mother.”); see also Kimberly Seals Allers, There is a Single Mother Hierar-
chy, and It Needs to Stop, WASH. POST (June 10, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parenting/wp/2016/06/10/the-single-mother-hierarchy/.
120. See Jane Waldfogel et al., Fragile Families and Child Well-Being, 20 FUTURE OF CHILDREN
87, 91 (2010); Sara McLanahan, Fragile Families and the Reproduction of Poverty, 621 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 111, 111 (2009).
121. Although half of non-marital children are born to cohabiting parents, the majority of non-
marital parents are not romantically involved by the time the child is five years old. Sara McLanahan & 
Audrey N. Beck, Parental Relationships in Fragile Families, 20 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 17 (2010) 
(cohabiting parents are more likely than married parents to be poor, have less formal education, and to 
experience family instability (breakups and multi-partner fertility) which is strongly associated with 
poorer outcomes for children). See Wendy Manning, Cohabitation and Child Well-Being, 25 FUTURE 
OF CHILDREN 51, 51 (2015). However, studies show that “stable cohabiting families with two biological 
parents seem to offer many of the same health, cognitive, and behavioral benefits that stable married 
biological parent families provide.” Id. African-American mothers are less likely than women of other 
races to be living with the child’s father at birth and are less likely than other groups to ever marry the 
father. 
122. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34756, NONMARITAL 





      03/01/2017   10:44:39
38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 70 Side A      03/01/2017   10:44:39
5 MALDONADO MACRO EDITS WITH AUTHOR CMTS 1-30 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2017 8:20 PM
2017] ROMANTIC DISCRIMINATION AND CHILDREN 125
academically, become teen parents, abuse drugs, engage in delinquent behavior, 
experience behavioral problems, and earn lower wages as adults.123 They are also 
less likely to attend college or receive financial support as children124 or as 
adults.125 Researchers cannot completely explain the reasons for these poorer out-
comes, but many argue that fewer resources—rather than growing up in a home 
with two married parents—are the source of these disadvantages.126 Indeed, the
law’s preference for marital childbearing and the legal benefits it grants to married 
couples may explain the differences in outcomes.127 With the possible exception of 
academic achievement,128 these outcomes disproportionately affect African-
American and Latino children who are more likely to be raised in single-parent 
families.129 While a close relationship with both parents may reduce these risks, 
divorced and non-marital fathers disengage from their children at alarmingly high 
rates.130
in 2007, 41% of women with non-marital children had incomes below the poverty level but only 19% 
had incomes above $50,000).
123. Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, Father Absence and Child Well-Being: A Critical 
Review, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 116, 120–21 (Daniel Patrick Moynihan et al., eds., 2004); 
Maldonado, supra note 115, at 372, n.167. Of course, the majority of children raised in single-parent 
homes do not experience these negative outcomes but, as a group, they are more likely than children 
raised by married parents to experience poor outcomes. Id. at 373–74.
124. See Timothy S. Grall, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2007, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU 6–8 (Nov. 2009), http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-237.pdf (reporting that 
62.8% of divorced parents had a child support order as compared to only 43.5% of never married 
parents and 51.2% of divorced parents with a child support order received the full amount owed as 
compared to less than 40% of never married parents); See also Minority Families and Child Support: 
Data Analysis, OFF. OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T. 35, 63 (2007), http:// 
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/DCL/2007/dcl-07-43a.pdf (finding the “child support process is 
most responsive to divorced parents and least responsive to never-married parents”).
125. For example, they are less likely to receive help with the down payment for a house, or to 
receive an inheritance from the father or paternal grandparents.
126. Maldonado, supra note 115, at 372–73 (discussing studies). 
127. Vivian Hamilton, Family Structure, Children and the Law, 24 WASH. U. J. L. POL’Y 9, 10 
(2007); See Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1252 
(2010) (noting that the “law channel[s] individuals . . . into marriage, and from marriage into coupled 
parenthood.”); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 956–57 (Mass. 2003) 
(describing the numerous federal and state benefits available to married couples).
128. One study found that while whites and Latinos raised in single-parent families tend to have 
lower levels of educational attainment than children raised by married parents, African-American 
children in single parent homes may acquire more education than African-American children living 
with both parents. See JEFF GROGGER & NICK RONAN, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, THE INTERGENERATIONAL 
EFFECTS OF FATHERLESSNESS ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND ENTRY-LEVEL WAGES ii-iii (1995), 
http://www.bls.gov/osmr/pdf/nl950080.pdf; see also SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR,
GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 87–88 (1994) (“[W]ith respect to 
educational achievement, father absence has the most harmful effects among Hispanics and the least 
harmful effects among Blacks.”).
129. Child Support Enforcement, supra note 124, at 3–4 (finding that in 2002, 66% of white 
mothers but only 48% of African-American mothers had child support orders); id. at 8 (concluding that 
the difference in child support rates is “largely due to racial and ethnic family formation differences.”).
130. Sara McLanahan & Audrey N. Beck, Parental Relationships in Fragile Families, 20 FUTURE 
OF CHILDREN 17 (2010) (By the time the child is five years old, only 51% of unmarried fathers visit at 
least once a month and one-third have no contact with their children at all). The vast majority of chil-
dren in single-parent families live with their mother. Families and Living Arrangements: America’s
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Marriage is not the solution to the potential disadvantages experienced by 
non-marital and disproportionately African-American and Latino children. These 
disadvantages are the result of social inequality, lack of resources, residential seg-
regation, and an educational system that fails children in poor and minority neigh-
borhoods. Yet, the advantages and opportunities available to marital children are 
increasingly significant and have created a divide of haves versus have nots along 
marital lines. Low-income and working class individuals (who are disproportion-
ately African-American or Latino/a) increasingly postpone or forego marriage but 
not childbearing.131 As a result, single and cohabitating parents are disproportion-
ately poor and have few resources to invest in their children. In contrast, college-
educated individuals postpone marriage and childbearing until they are financially 
stable. This latter group invests more resources in their children than prior genera-
tions ever have.132 Assortative mating has magnified the inequality between mari-
tal and non-marital children as highly educated and successful individuals marry 
and have children with highly educated and successful partners, leaving low-
income individuals to create “fragile families.”133
While the class inequality exacerbated by assortative mating is troubling, this 
Essay focuses on the racial inequality created by preferences in the dating and 
marriage market. Consequently, it focuses on the dating market for college-
educated African-American women since their children are most affected by racial 
preferences in the marriage market. While racial preferences may also disad-
vantage the children of low-income African-American mothers, their children are 
much more disadvantaged by poverty, family instability,134 and lack of access to 
adequate schools and safe neighborhoods—problems that will not be remedied by 
eliminating racial preferences in the romantic marketplace.
The number of children affected by racial preferences in the dating and mar-
riage market is small as compared to the number of African-American children in 
“fragile families.” These children are amongst the most privileged, as their mothers 
are college-educated and likely to be financially stable. These children are also 
likely to attend quality schools and to reside in desirable neighborhoods. Given 
their relative privilege, one might ask whether it is worthwhile to explore how 
racial preferences limit their access to resources and opportunities when so many 
children have significantly fewer advantages. I contend that it is. When we exam-
ine opportunities for children, we should not focus only on the most disadvantaged 
updated Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.census.gov/hhes/families/data/cps2013C.html (85% of children 
living with only one parent lived with their mother only).
131. KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT 
MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 109 (2005).
132. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 24, at 84–89; A. LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS 300 (2011);
as sociologist Andrew Cherlin has stated “[i]t is the privileged who are marrying and marrying helps 
them stay privileged.” Jason DeParle, Two Classes, Divided by “I Do”, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2012) 
(quoting Andrew Cherlin), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/us/two-classes-in-america-divided-by-
i-do.html?_r=0).
133. The “Fragile Families and Child Well-Being” study tracked 5000, primarily non-marital, 
children born from 1998 to 2000 in large U.S. cities. See PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, FRAGILE FAMILIES 
& CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu (last visited Sept. 28, 2016). 
134. See Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive, Social, and 
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children but should also address barriers that prevent all children from taking ad-
vantage of opportunities available to a select few. For example, it is not enough for 
all children to attend adequate schools if some children have opportunities to at-
tend superior schools because of their race. Similarly, it is troubling if children of 
college-educated Asian-Americans mothers have greater access to resources and 
opportunities than the children of college-educated African-American women, if 
those advantages are the result of racial preferences.
In the United States, marriage has historically been a mechanism for wom-
en’s economic security. 135 Even today, some women rely on marriage as a tool for 
economic security and upward mobility.136 Historically, marriage has not provided 
these economic benefits to African-American women who married African-
American men, as the earnings of African-American men have always been much 
lower than those of White men.137 This remains true today, as African-American 
women are twice as likely as their male counterparts to graduate from college and
almost three times as likely to obtain a post-graduate degree.138 However, minority 
women who intermarry with White men enjoy significantly higher family incomes 
and wealth than those who marry in. For example, in 2010, the median family 
income of White/Latino/a marriages was $57,900 as compared to $35,578 for 
Latino/Latina marriages.139 Asian-Americans who intermarried with Whites 
earned higher combined incomes than all other couples—same-race or interra-
cial.140 Minority women who intermarry with Whites live in wealthier neighbor-
hoods and are more likely to have access to intergenerational transfers of wealth 
than minority women in same-race marriages.
The children of White/non-White marriages tend to enjoy greater access to 
safe neighborhoods, high quality schools, economic resources, and intergenera-
tional transfers of wealth than the children of minority couples. They also enjoy the 
intangible benefits of access to networks that rarely include minorities. For exam-
ple, a child who resides in a wealthier neighborhood with high quality schools
135. STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW LOVE 
CONQUERED MARRIAGE 243 (2005). 
136. This Essay focuses on women’s marital rates because the vast majority of children in single-
parent households reside with their mothers. 
137. Linda M. Burton & M. Belinda Tucker, Romantic Unions in an Era of Uncertainty: A Post-
Moynihan Perspective on African-American Women and Marriage, in 621 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. 132, 
143 (2009).
138. Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, PEW RES. CTR. WOMEN SEE VALUE AND BENEFITS OF 
COLLEGE; MEN LAG ON BOTH FRONTS, SURVEY FINDS 13 (2011); Nat’l Center for Education Statistics 
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=72 (reporting that 71% of African Americans who earned a 
Master’s degree in 2009-2010 were women as were 66% of those who earned a Bachelor’s degree)
139. Wang, supra note 10, at 6; One study of the three largest Latino groups—Mexican-
Americans, Cuban-Americans, and Puerto Ricans found that for all three groups, members who inter-
married with Whites enjoyed higher financial resources than counterparts who married in. Xuanning Fu, 
Marital Assimilation and Family Financial Resources of U.S. Born Hispanics, 2 OPEN SOC. J. 10, 16 
(2009); see also Sharon M. Lee & Barry Edmonston, New Marriages, New Families: U.S. Racial and 
Hispanic Intermarriage, 60 POP. BULL. 1, 23 (“Children living in white/Asian interracial families had 
the highest mean family income.”).
140. Wang, supra note 10, at 6. White/Asian newlyweds of 2008 through 2010 had median com-
bined annual earnings of $70,952 as compared to $60,000 for White/White couples and $62,000 for 
Asian/Asian couples. African-Americans married to Whites had a median family income of $53,187 as 
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neighborhoods that are disproportionately White may have greater access to 
coveted internships and academic opportunities not available is less privileged 
neighborhoods and schools. Some of these opportunities are formal—the school in 
the wealthier neighborhood may have more guidance counselors who search for 
opportunities and help students secure them. Other opportunities are informal and 
can only be described as networks or as one single mother described “access to 
power.”141 These networks help individuals obtain jobs, internships, and clients, 
opportunities that are not available to individuals outside the network.142
Racial preferences limit the pool of potential partners available to African-
American women and reduce the likelihood that their children will be raised in 
financially secure, two-parent homes and have access to the resources and oppor-
tunities available to the children of interracial marriages. When highly educated 
and financially successful men—who are disproportionately White or Asian-
American—exclude African-American women as potential romantic and ultimate-
ly marriage partners, African-American women may end up marrying men with 
lower levels of educational attainment and income. Those marriages will not only 
have fewer resources, but are also at higher risk of divorce.143 Consequently, the 
children of those marriages may be more likely to grow up with fewer resources 
and to spend part of their childhood in a single parent home.
One might not be sympathetic to an African-American college-educated 
woman who rejects a same-race partner with an average income because she would 
prefer a higher income partner. But African-American women are not rejecting 
same-race partners with average incomes. They are rejecting partners with low 
incomes or no income at all. The pool of employed African-American men is so 
thin that African-American women may find it difficult to find a same-race partner 
who is employed period.144 For example, one recent study reported that there are 
141. Interview with YG (Aug. 12, 2016) (on file with author).
142. See Elizabeth Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in Accidents of Sex and Love,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1377 (2009) and accompanying text (noting that “families are at the heart of 
communities and thus of social and employment networks. Who one knows has significant effects on 
one’s opportunities.”).
143. Linda M. Burton & M. Belinda Tucker, Romantic Unions in an Era of Uncertainty: A Post-
Moynihan Perspective on African-American Women and Marriage, 621 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. 132
(Jan. 2009); RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE: HOW THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE 112 (2011) (proposing that African-American women marry 
“out” instead of marrying “down”); Id. (women who marry less successful men (educationally or 
occupationally) have higher divorce rate); College educated African-Americans are significantly more 
likely as college educated Whites to divorce. Id. See Richard Fry, The Reversal of the College Marriage 
Gap, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/10/07/the-reversal-of-the-
college-marriage-gap/.
144. The mass incarceration of African-American men and the existence of a criminal record 
severely limits employment opportunities. See Christopher J. Lyons & Becky Pettit, Compounded 
Disadvantage: Race, Incarceration, and Wage Growth, 58 SOC. PROBS. 257, 259 (2011). In some cities 
like Milwaukee, almost one in eight African-American men has spent time in prison. See John Pawasa-
rat & Lois M. Quinn, Wisconsin’s Mass Incarceration of African-American Males: Workforce Chal-
lenges for 2013, https://www4.uwm.edu/eti/2013/BlackImprisonment.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2016). 
According to the Sentencing Project, ten percent of African-American men in their thirties are in prison 
on any given day. Trends in U.S. Corrections,THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf (last 
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“51 employed young black men for every 100 young black women,” ages 25–
34.145 In contrast, “[a]mong never-married white, Hispanic and Asian American 
young adults, the ratio of employed men to women is roughly equal—100 men for 
every 100 women.”146 The pool is even more limited for African-American wom-
en seeking a college-educated same-race partner as African-American women 
graduate from college at twice the rate of their male counterparts. 147 Successful 
African-American men are more likely than African-American women to intermar-
ry, thereby decreasing the pool of marriageable African-American men available to 
African-American women.148
Given the limited pool of marriageable African-American men, some 
middle class African-American women will not find a same-race partner. Their 
own racial preferences for African-American men and those of non-Black men for 
non-Black women, further limit African-American women’s opportunities to mar-
ry. Indeed, African-American women are more than three times as likely as white 
women to never marry.149 Given their limited prospects for marriage, the African-
American community’s greater acceptance of non-marital childbearing, and socie-
ty’s increased acceptance of single-parent families, it is not surprising that some 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf (reporting that 35% of jail population is African-
American); E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2014 15 (2015), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf (reporting that 37% of male prison population is African-
American). African-Americans comprised 13% of the U.S. population in 2015. See Quick Facts, U.S.
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/00 (last visited Sept. 28, 2016).
145. Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, PEW RES. CTR., RECORD SHARE OF AMERICANS HAVE NEVER 
MARRIED 14 (2014). “In most racial and ethnic groups, men are more likely than women to have never 
been married. The major exception is among blacks. In 2012, roughly equal shares of black men (36%) 
and black women (35%) ages 25 and older had never been married.” Id. at 11. Interestingly, African-
American women express a preference for men “having primary economic responsibility . . . despite the 
remoteness of such a prospect.” Burton & Tucker, supra note 143, at 142 (noting that many middle 
class African-Americans view “a traditional alignment of household responsibilities . . . as an achieve-
ment in the larger society’s terms.”); PEW RES. CTR., supra note 111, at 28 (finding that “[f]ully 88% of 
black respondents (compared with 62% of whites and 77% of Hispanics) say that in order to be ready 
for marriage, a man must be able to support a family financially” and concluding that “blacks are the 
racial group most inclined to consider financial security a prerequisite to marriage.”).
146. Wang & Parker, supra note 145, at 14. 
147. Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, PEW RES. CTR. WOMEN SEE VALUE AND BENEFITS OF 
COLLEGE; MEN LAG ON BOTH FRONTS, SURVEY FINDS 13 (2011) (“In 2010, only 37% of black college 
graduates were men and 63% were women. Among white, Hispanic and Asian college graduates, the 
share of men is close to the average of 45%.”).
148. College-educated African-American men seeking to marry do not face the same challenges as 
African-American women. Although African-American men are rejected at high rates by online daters 
of other races, they are two to three times as likely as African-American women to intermarry. While 
the challenges faced by professional African-American women seeking a mate are well-documented, 
see, e.g., BANKS, supra note 143, at 33; KARYN LANGHORNE FOLAN, DON’T BRING HOME A WHITE 
BOY: AND OTHER NOTIONS THAT KEEP BLACK WOMEN FROM DATING OUT 43 (2010), given the large 
pool of educated African-American women seeking a same-race partner, it is doubtful that racial prefer-
ences affect African-American men’s ability to marry (someone). Similarly, Asian-American men have 
high rates of marriage (despite relatively low rates of intermarriage compared to Asian American 
women) so racial preferences do not seem to restrict their ability to find a mate either.
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college-educated African-American women choose to raise a child without a 
spouse.150
The children of college-educated African-American “single mothers by 
choice”151 are unlikely to experience the increased risk of poor outcomes faced by 
children of low-income single mothers.152 However, they are unlikely to enjoy all 
of the advantages of children raised by two college-educated parents. First, most 
families need two-incomes to maintain a home in a desirable neighborhood with 
high quality schools, and access to extracurricular and cultural activities that are 
increasingly necessary for children to compete when applying to college or sum-
mer internships.153 Second, most families need two incomes to save for a child’s 
college education. Single parents, even those who are financially stable, are less 
likely than married parents to be able to afford to pay for a child’s college educa-
tion. Third, single parents “have no one with whom to share the financial, logisti-
cal, or emotional burdens of being a parent.”154 As a result, single mothers, albeit 
privileged single mothers, will likely have fewer resources—financial, emotional, 
and time to expend on their children and cultivate opportunities for their success. 
Finally, single parents, and by extension their children, may be excluded from 
networks that married parents inhabit. Given the single-mother hierarchy, African-
American single mothers are more likely than White single mothers to be excluded 
from these networks.155 As one divorced woman observed “as an African-
American woman - even with an Ivy League education and a middle-class income 
– [she] was still subject to the stereotypical perception of ‘the black single moth-
er’.”156
150. Women of other races also intentionally chose to become single parents. See generally
SINGLE MOTHERS BY CHOICE, http://www.singlemothersbychoice.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2016).
151. See Tomiko Fraser Hines, Being a Single Mother by Choice, Part 2 (Mar. 1, 2016), 
http://madamenoire.com/616917/being-a-single-mother-by-choice-part-2/ (noting that single mother-
hood by choice is not an uncommon for professional African-American); Many Women Choosing to be 
Single Mothers, ATLANTA BLACK STAR, Mar. 29, 2013, http://atlantablackstar.com/2013/03/29/being-
a-single-mother-is-a-chioce/.
152. Claire Cain Miller, Single Motherhood, in Decline Over All, Rises for Women 35 and Older,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/upshot/out-of-wedlock-births-are-
falling-except-among-older-women.html (discussing increase in rate of nonmarital births to women 
over the age of 35).
153. See Chris Taylor, Single Moms by Choice: Making the Finances Work, REUTERS, Sept. 9, 
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-money-singlemoms-idUSKBN0H41D220140909. As one 
African-American single mother by choice stated, “I make a very comfortable living . . . That said, it’s
still one income. And living in southern California, there are certain things that are difficult to attain on 
a single income. Like a larger home, or private school tuition . . . .”; Tomiko Fraser Hines, Being a 
Single Mother by Choice, Part I (Feb. 29, 2016), http://madamenoire.com/616911/being-a-single-
mother-by-choice-part-1/.
154. Isabel Sawhill, Celebrating Single Mothers by Choice (May 8, 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/2015/05/08/celebrating-single-mothers-by-choice/.
155. See Allers, supra note 119 (stating that “society secretly categorizes single mothers in gradi-
ents of respectability depending on income, race, and most important, how you became a single moth-
er.”).
156. Allers, supra note 119 (noting that some college-educated African-American single mothers 
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For many college-educated single mothers, an increased pool of marriageable 
men would not have altered their decision to raise a child without a partner despite 
the challenges discussed above.157 However, at least some women who are raising 
children alone might have preferred to do so with a partner had they found the 
“right” partner. There are many reasons individuals do not find a marriage partner, 
but African-American women face greater challenges due to a limited pool of 
marriageable African-American men and racial preferences that decrease their 
likelihood of partnering with men of other races as college-educated Asian-
American and Latina women often do. As a result, the children of college-educated 
African-American women are unlikely to have access to the benefits available to 
the children of similarly educated Asian-American and Latina women. What, if 
anything, should the law do to help children who are not disadvantaged relative to 
the most vulnerable African-American families, but are less advantaged than the 
children of two parent families? Before we attempt to answer this question, we 
should first explore the law’s role in shaping racial preferences.
III. LAW’S ROLE IN SHAPING RACIAL PREFERENCES
“The heart [may] want[] what it wants”158 but racial preferences are not 
shaped in a vacuum. They are influenced by historical and current social and legal 
norms. The law’s explicit role in shaping romantic preferences is extensive. States 
prohibited marriages between African-Americans and Whites as early as the seven-
teenth century through the enactment of laws banishing or enslaving Whites who 
married Black slaves.159 Although most states did not prohibit interracial sex, these 
laws signaled that African-Americans were not appropriate romantic partners.
After the Civil War, many more states enacted anti-miscegenation laws. 
Forty-one states prohibited marriages between Whites and African-Americans at 
some point.160 Southern states segregated Whites and non-Whites in public spaces 
and the federal government maintained segregated offices and military units.161
The courts enforced laws, private covenants, and practices that denied African-
Americans housing and employment opportunities available to Whites.162 These 
157. See Katy Chatel, I’m a Single Mother by Choice, One Parent Can Be Better Than Two,
WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/03/16/im-a-
single-mother-by-choice-one-parent-can-be-better-than-two/?utm_term=.cee9f5971f47. 
158. RICHARD B. SEWALL, THE LIFE OF EMILY DICKINSON 493 (2000).
159. Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Ameri-
cans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1171–74 (1997); PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES 
NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA 20 (2009).
160. See DAVID FOWLER, NORTHERN ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE:
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC AND THE STATES OF THE OLD 
NORTHWEST 1780 1930, at 7 (1987).
161. DESMOND S. KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE U.S. FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 1–3 (1995); Dick Lehr, The Racist Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 27. 
2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2015/11/the-racist-legacy-of-woodrow-wilson-contd/417990. 
See generally ERIC YELLIN, RACISM IN THE NATION’S SERVICE: GOVERNMENT WORKERS AND THE 
COLOR LINE IN WOODROW WILSON’S AMERICA (2016).
162. RICHARD BROOKS & CAROL ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE 
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practices limited opportunities for interracial contact and reinforced social distance 
between African-Americans and Whites.
The law’s explicit regulation of interracial intimacy ended in 1967 with 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia.163 The federal govern-
ment also passed legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in employment and 
housing and attempted to enforce the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board
of Education164 mandating desegregation of schools. 165 Despite these reforms, the 
legal policies that facilitated race discrimination until the 1960s continue to shape 
our racial preferences today. Racially restrictive covenants, redlining, and racial 
steering created the racially segregated neighborhoods and schools that anti-
discrimination laws have failed to integrate. These practices, which continue today 
despite laws prohibiting them,166 also created the disparity in wealth between Afri-
can-Americans and Whites that make it impossible for most African-Americans to 
acquire property in these neighborhoods today.167 These structural inequalities 
limit opportunities for African-Americans and Whites to interact as equals and 
consider members of the other group as potential romantic partners.
The law has also contributed to the dearth of marriageable African-
American men. Failing schools and a racialized criminal justice system have led to 
the mass incarceration of African-American men and rendered them virtually em-
ployable and unmarriageable after their release,168 leaving African-American 
women to raise children alone (or pursue relationships with men of other races).
The law’s active role in facilitating discrimination and its failure to reme-
dy the continuing effects of its discriminatory policies would support state inter-
vention to ensure that African-American children’s access to resources and 
opportunities are not limited by racial preferences that the law helped shape or 
reinforce. However, even if the law had not played an active role in shaping our 
romantic preferences, the state’s interest in eradicating disadvantages deriving 
from racial discrimination would warrant intervention to provide children affected 
by racial preferences with similar opportunities as other children.
Determining how the state should support these children is no easy task 
given limited resources especially when these children already have greater access 
to resources and opportunities than significantly disadvantaged children such as 
those in “fragile families.” At minimum, however, the recognition that despite their 
relative advantages, racial preferences may disadvantage the children of college 
educated African-American mothers suggests that the state should support all fami-
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH 
CENTURY AMERICA (2005).
163. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
164. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
165. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Fair Housing Act, Pub. 
L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 72 (1968).
166. For example, banks continue to engage in redlining, realtors continue to steer African-
Americans towards minority neighborhoods and away from predominantly White neighborhoods, and 
homeowners and landlords continue to reject African-American homebuyers and renters. Further, 
federal law exempts owner-occupied dwellings of four or fewer units from its anti-discrimination 
mandate. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604. This is known as the “Mrs. Murphy” exemption. 
167. See generally KATZNELSON, supra note 162.
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lies regardless of family form. This might be as simple as celebrating all families—
married, divorced, blended, cohabitating, and single-parent—and eliminating the 
message that marital families are superior. Instead of the federal Healthy Marriage 
Initiative169 which funds projects that seek to encourage marriage before childbear-
ing,170 and signals that marital families are superior to other family forms,171 the 
federal government should fund a Healthy Families Initiative. A Healthy Families
Initiative should, like the current Healthy Marriage Initiative, be part of the federal 
government’s “strategy to enhance child well-being.” 172 However, instead of 
funding “public advertising campaigns on the value of healthy marriages” as the 
federal government does now, a Healthy Families Initiative would fund campaigns 
on the value of healthy families and parent-child relationships. These reforms 
would redirect funds away from programs seeking to promote marriage (and which 
have been unsuccessful) and towards programs that support parents regardless of 
their family structure. The name change alone would signal that all families are 
valued.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Essay’s focus on the relative disadvantages experienced by the children 
of privileged—college educated African-American single mothers—might seem 
trivial given the significant poverty, family instability, and risk of poor outcomes 
faced by the much larger number of African-American children in fragile families. 
However, racial inequality affecting one child is still one too many. Further, the 
stigmatization of single-parent families, especially if African-American, negatively 
impacts all children in non-marital families regardless of their parents’ income and 
education. A Healthy Families Initiative would benefit the children of college-
educated single mothers by signaling that their families are no less normative than 
marital families. It would also direct resources to the families that need them most 
to secure their children’s well-being rather than making support dependent on 
marriage.
169. Healthy Marriage, OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/programs/healthy-marriage/healthy-marriage, (last visited Sep. 8, 2016).
170. Maldonado, supra note 115, at 384 (discussing project funded by the Healthy Marriage 
Initiative that expressly sought “to increase the number of marriages before conception . . . .”).
171. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, supra note 169 (“Children living in two-parent, married 
household do better in school, have fewer behavioral problems, and are more likely to have successful 
marriages of their own.”).
172. Id.
